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Abstract 
      
Over the last 12 years, the percentage of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget 
spent on the procurement of services has risen consistently (Gansler, 2001).  In an 
attempt to maximize cost savings in the rapidly growing services sector, the DoD 
established a Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) strategy that focuses on 
evaluating contractor performance based on their ability to meet desired outcomes rather 
than the means to which the outcomes are obtained.  In April 2000, Dr. Gansler, then 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, issued a 
memorandum mandating that 50 percent of all eligible service acquisitions be awarded 
using PBSA methods by Fiscal Year (FY) 2005.  While some studies (Ausnik, Camm, & 
Cannon, 2001; Ausnik, Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002) have attempted to measure the 
potential increases in quality and cost savings, very little research has been focused on 
USAF implementation of PBSA and the progress and attainment of the PBSA goals.   
  Using multiple years of comprehensive data obtained from the Air Force 
Contract Reporting System, also known as the J001, this thesis extends on previous 
PBSA research (Lacey, 2004) and seeks to evaluate and analyze the current and expected 
future states of PBSA implementation in the USAF, including an assessment of current 
performance against PBSA goals, the development of forecasts of future performance 
against PBSA goals, and the evaluation of PBSA contract characteristics.  A combination 
of descriptive statistics, forecasting, contingency tables, and regression were used to 
analyze the data, draw conclusions, and make recommendations for PBSA 
 iv
implementation improvements.  The results conclude that the USAF is not meeting 
interim PBSA goals and will most likely fall short of the FY 2005 PBSA goal.  These 
results suggest that the goals may not have been reasonable and that the USAF has hit a 
natural plateau in PBSA use.   
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Performance Based Service Acquisition: A Quantitative Evaluation of Implementation 
Goals and Performance in the United States Air Force  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Overview 
 The use of Performance Base Service Acquisition (PBSA) for the acquisition of 
services has become increasingly prevalent in the United States Air Force (USAF) as a 
result of PBSA goals.  These goals were mandated in an attempt to increase service 
quality and garner potential cost savings associated with the use of PBSA.  While some 
studies (Ausnik, Camm, & Cannon, 2001; Ausnik, Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002) 
have attempted to measure these potential increases in quality and cost savings, very little 
research (for one such study see Lacey, 2004) has been focused on USAF implementation 
of PBSA and the progress and attainment of the mandated PBSA goals.   
Using multiple years of data, this thesis extends Lacey’s research (Lacey, 2004) 
and seeks to evaluate and analyze the current and future states of PBSA implementation 
in the USAF, including an assessment of current performance against PBSA goals, the 
development of forecasts of future performance against PBSA goals, and the evaluation 
of PBSA contract characteristics.  Additionally, this thesis will provide recommendations 
for PBSA implementation improvements in order to assist USAF leadership in making 
decisions based on the current state of PBSA.   
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Background 
Over the last 12 years, the percentage of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget 
spent on the procurement of services has risen consistently (Gansler, 2001).  In an 
attempt to increase cost savings in this rapidly growing procurement sector, the DoD 
established a performance based service acquisition strategy that focuses on evaluating 
contractor performance based on their ability to meet desired outcomes rather than the 
means to which the outcomes are obtained.  In April 2000, Dr. Gansler, then Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, issued a memorandum 
mandating that, at a minimum, 50 percent of all eligible service acquisitions, measured in 
both dollars and actions, be awarded using PBSA methods by Fiscal Year (FY) 2005.   
In order to understand the potential benefits of PBSA, it is first important to 
understand the meaning and concepts of PBSA.  The Guidebook for Performance-Based 
Services Acquisitions in the Department of Defense (PBSA Guidebook) defines PBSA as 
acquisition strategies, methods, and techniques that describe and communicate 
measurable outcomes rather than direct performance processes (DoD, 2001).  Simply, 
PBSA asks contractors to meet a desired outcome rather than telling them how to meet 
the outcome.  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 37.6 describes 
characteristics consistent with PBSA designated contracts.  According to FAR Subpart 
37.6, performance-based contracts or task orders exhibit the following characteristics: 
(1) Describe requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods of 
performance of the work. 
(2) Use measurable performance standards and quality assurance surveillance 
plans. 
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(3) Specify procedures for reduction of fee or reduction to price of a fixed price 
contract when services are not performed or do not meet contract 
requirements. 
(4) Include performance incentives when appropriate.   
Past research suggests that by utilizing these characteristics and describing 
requirements in terms of performance outcomes, beneficial outcomes or objectives will 
be achieved.  For instance, in 1998 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), 
which is a central office that provides direction for procurement policy and the 
development of procurement systems, concluded a four year study on PBSA.  According 
to the study, the utilization of PBSA reduced contract prices, improved customer 
satisfaction, and increased competition (OFPP, 1998). The PBSA Guidebook also 
suggests potential benefits of PBSA usage by listing the five objectives that the use of 
PBSA can help achieve.  Quoting from the Guidebook, these five objectives are: 
(1) Maximize Performance – By following its own best practices, a contractor can 
deliver the required service.  Since the prime focus is on the end result, 
contractors can adjust their processes, as appropriate, throughout the life of 
the contract without the burden of contract modifications.  This adjustment 
may be done as long as the delivered service (outcome) remains in accordance 
with the contract.  The use of incentives further motivates contractors to 
furnish their best performance. 
(2) Maximize Competition and Innovation – Encouraging innovation from the 
supplier base by using performance requirements maximizes opportunities for 
competitive alternatives in lieu of government-directed solutions.  Since 
PBSA allows for greater innovation, it has the potential to attract a broader 
industry base. 
(3) Encourage and Promote the Use of Commercial Services – The vast majority 
of service requirements are commercial in nature.  Use of Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) Part 12 (Acquisition of Commercial Items) procedures 
provides great benefits by minimizing the reporting burden and reducing the 
use of government-unique contract clauses and similar requirements, which 
can help attract a broader industry base.   
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(4) Shift in Risk – When contractors become responsible for achieving the 
objectives in the work statement through the use of their own best practices 
and processes, much of the risk is shifted from the government to industry.  
Agencies should consider this reality in determining the appropriate 
acquisition incentives.   
(5) Achieve Savings – Experience in both government and industry has 
demonstrated the use of performance requirements results in cost savings.    
 
The interest in applying PBSA and realizing its benefits increases as the 
percentage of the DoD budget spent on services continues to grow.  In 1991 the OFPP 
issued the first policy letter, Policy Letter 91-2, addressing PBSA.  This policy letter 
established policy for the Government’s acquisition of services by contract, emphasizing 
the use of performance requirements and quality standards in defining contract 
requirements, source selection, and quality assurance.  Since the issuance of Policy Letter 
91-2, multiple directives and guidance documents have been issued for both the Federal 
Government and the USAF.  However, it was not until Dr. Gansler’s (2000) 
memorandum on PBSA that the implementation of PBSA in the USAF began to take 
shape.   
 
Problem 
In order to evaluate the performance of PBSA implementation, USAF decision 
makers need to know the current state of PBSA in the USAF.  Furthermore, USAF 
decision makers need to know whether or not mandated PBSA goals are currently being 
met and will be met in the future.  Additionally, USAF leadership needs to know if these 
PBSA goals are reasonably attainable.  Recent research on PBSA implementation in the 
DoD is limited, but one study (Lacey, 2004) suggests that the USAF is not on course to 
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meet mandated goals.  However, Lacey’s study is extremely exploratory, using only one 
year of USAF comprehensive data for analysis (Lacey, 2004).   
Research Question  
The over arching research question is, “What are the current and future expected 
states of PBSA implementation in the USAF?”   This question was answered by 
conducting an evaluation and analysis of the current and future states of PBSA 
implementation in the USAF using archival data obtained from the Air Force Contract 
Reporting System, also known as the J001.  The evaluation and analysis included the 
assessment of current performance against PBSA goals, forecasting of future 
performance against PBSA goals, the evaluation of PBSA contract characteristics, and 
recommendations for PBSA implementation improvement.    
 
Investigative Questions 
Because the research question for this study is so broad, several investigative 
questions were developed in an attempt to evaluate as many aspects of PBSA 
implementation as possible, including the reliability of the J001 database.  The five 
investigative questions this study answers are: 
IQ1.  Is the J001 database, which is the source of government procurement data, 
reliable? 
IQ2.  Is the USAF meeting interim PBSA goals? 
IQ3.  Is the USAF on track to meet future mandated PBSA goals? 
IQ4.  Is the percentage of modifications coded PBSA equal to the percentage of 
non-modifications coded PBSA?   
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IQ5.  Are any particular acquisition characteristics associated with PBSA use? 
IQ5a.  What are the antecedents to the use of PBSA?   
IQ5b.  What are the barriers to the use of PBSA?  
Investigative question one was developed in order to ensure that the database from which 
the data for this study was extracted was reliable.  Investigative questions two and three 
were developed in order to answer the obvious questions of whether or not the USAF is 
meeting interim and will meet future PBSA goals.  Investigative question four was 
developed in order to see if PBSA percentages are consistent for new contract awards and 
modifications.  This is important because a difference in the two percentages may imply 
that PBSA contracts are modified more or less often than non-PBSA contracts or that 
PBSA modifications are more or less costly than non-PBSA modifications.  Lastly, 
investigative question five was developed in order to identify contract variables that may 
increase or decrease the probability of PBSA use.    
 
Methodology 
The first investigative question was formulated in order to ensure reliability of the 
data manually entered into the J001 database.  The J001 is a database comprised of DD 
Form 350, Individual Contracting Action Report, information for all Air Force 
contracting actions exceeding $25,000.  Investigative question 1 was answered by taking 
a sample of contracts coded PBSA in the J001 database and evaluating them against the 
four mandatory criteria for PBSA identified in the PBSA Guidebook. 
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Investigative questions 2 through 5 were answered by collecting data directly 
from the J001, for all USAF service contracts from FY 2001 through FY 2004.  The data 
was analyzed using descriptive statistics, forecasting, contingency tables, and regression. 
 
Proposed Contributions 
 By following the steps outlined above, this thesis will further the knowledge and 
understanding of the use of PBSA in the USAF.  First, it will provide insight to the 
reliability of the J001 database.  Secondly, it will allow USAF leadership to see how well 
the USAF is meeting interim mandated PBSA goals and progressing towards future 
goals.  Additionally, this study will validate the establishment of mandated PBSA goals 
and help decision-makers establish better future goals.  Lastly, the results from this study 
will help procurement personnel identify when to use PBSA.  
 
Summary 
 This chapter presented the overall basic components of the research effort.  First, 
the background to PBSA implementation in the USAF and how it has led to the 
formation of the problem statement, research questions, and subsequent investigative 
questions were explained.  Next, a summary of current knowledge and methodology used 
to answer the investigative questions was presented.  Lastly, the proposed contributions 
were addressed.  The following chapter will provide a review of the literature relevant to 
PBSA, describing the evolution of PBSA within the Federal Government and the DoD.   
 7
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the creation, implementation, and 
evaluation of the Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) initiative in the United 
States Air Force (USAF).  Besides basic definitions and an explanation of PBSA, this 
chapter explains how past policy, directives, and regulations established by the Federal 
Government, Department of Defense (DoD), and the USAF have led to the current state 
of PBSA within the USAF acquisition and contracting community.  
 
Federal Guidance 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 37 provides the policy and guidance 
for acquisition and management of service contracts.  Although the FAR does not 
establish any objective PBSA goals, its contents do state that performance-based 
contracting is the preferred method of acquiring services and requires the use of it to the 
maximum extent practicable.  
FAR Subpart 37.101 defines a service contract as, “a contract that directly 
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an 
identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply (FAR Part 37).”  
Additionally, the regulation notes that services can be performed by either professional or 
nonprofessional personnel and on an individual or organizational basis.  FAR Subpart 
37.101 identifies the following disciplines where service contracts may be found: 
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(1) Maintenance, overhaul, repair, servicing, rehabilitation, salvage, 
modernization, or modification of supplies, systems, or equipment.  
(2) Routine recurring maintenance of real property.  
(3) Housekeeping and base services.  
(4) Advisory and assistance services.  
(5) Operation of Government-owned equipment facilities, and systems.  
(6) Communications services.  
(7) Architect-Engineering (see Subpart 36.6).  
(8) Transportation and related services (see Part 47).  
(9) Research and development (see Part 35).   
It is worthy to note that, although included in the general list of services, research 
and development services (FAR Part 35), architect-engineering services (FAR Part 36), 
and transportation services (FAR Part 47) are governed by their respective FAR Parts in 
the event of inconsistencies in the FAR (FAR Part 37).  This precedence issue can 
become particularly important in any attempt to determine if PBSA should be used for 
the acquisition of these services. 
FAR Subpart 37.102 excludes specific service type contracts, including architect-
engineering services, construction, utility services, and services that are identical to 
supply purchases, from performance-based contracts.  In addition, FAR Subpart 37.102 
establishes an order of precedence for contract types when acquiring services.   The order 
of precedence established by FAR Subpart 37.102 for all service contracts is: 
(1) A firm-fixed price performance-based contract or task order.  
(2) A performance-based contract or task order that is not firm-fixed price.  
(3) A contract or task order that is not performance-based.  
 
This order of precedence suggests that the DoD’s top priority is to award service 
contracts or task orders using PBSA and preferably using a FFP contract.  The next 
priority suggested from this order of precedence is to use PBSA with non-fixed price 
contracts, such as cost reimbursement contracts.  The “last resort” is to award contracts or 
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task orders that are not performance-based.  Although this order of precedence provides 
only generalized guidance for the use of PBSA, it promotes the use of firm-fixed price 
(FFP) type contracts for PBSA.  However, by identifying the use of performance-based 
contracts or task orders that are not FFP as a possible service contract option it can be 
inferred that not all PBSA contracts need to or can be FFP.     
FAR Subpart 37.6 further promotes the use of FFP contracts for “services that can 
be defined objectively and for which the risk of performance is manageable (FAR Part 
37).”  This FAR Subpart also prescribes the policies and procedures for the use of PBSA, 
including but not limited to, the proper preparation of a PBSA Statement of Work 
(SOW), quality assurance, and the use of positive and negative performance incentives.  
Furthermore, according to FAR Subpart 37.6, PBSA contracts: 
(1) Describe requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods of 
performance of the work. 
(2) Use measurable performance standards and quality assurance surveillance 
plans. 
(3) Specify procedures for reduction of fee or reduction to price of a fixed price 
contract when services are not performed or do not meet contract 
requirements. 
(4) Include performance incentives when appropriate. 
 
In 1974, Public Law 93-400 required the Office of Management and Budget, 
through its Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), to establish a system for 
collecting, developing, and disseminating procurement data, which took into account the 
needs of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the public (United States Congress, 1974).  
This law led to the creation of the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), now a 
requirement under FAR Subpart 4.6.  The FPDS provides a comprehensive mechanism 
for assembling, organizing, and presenting contract placement data for the Federal 
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Government.  Subsequently, the DoD created the Defense Contract Action Data System 
(DCADS) which transmits all DoD procurement data to the FPDS.  In order to collect the 
appropriate data for the DCADS, the DoD created the DD Form 350, Individual 
Contracting Action Report, which is required for all delivery/task orders exceeding 
$25,000.  The DD Form 350 includes information about not only the type of action, but 
also numerous other contractor socio-economic characteristics, such as business size and 
ethnic ownership.  The USAF collects and transmits all DD Form 350 information to 
DCADS via the Air Force Contract Reporting System, also known as the J001.  The DD 
Form 350 and the related procurement databases are valuable sources for information 
pertaining to how the DoD, and specifically the USAF, spends taxpayer money.  
In 1991 the OFPP issued the first policy letter directed towards PBSA, Policy 
Letter 91-2.  This letter established policy for the Government’s acquisition of services 
by contract, emphasizing the use of performance requirements and quality standards in 
defining contract requirements, source selection, and quality assurance.  The letter states,  
It is the policy of the Federal Government that (1) agencies use performance-
based contracting methods to the maximum extent practicable when acquiring 
services, and (2) agencies carefully select acquisition and contract administration 
strategies, methods, and techniques that best accommodate the requirements 
(OFPP, 1991). 
  
Once again, the preference for the use of FFP contracts rather than cost reimbursement 
contracts is emphasized for instances where services can be objectively defined and risk 
is manageable.  However, the policy letter also clearly states that all contracts, regardless 
of contract type, shall include incentive provisions to ensure that contractors are rewarded 
for good performance and penalized for unsatisfactory performance.  This provision adds 
to the more basic requirements of FAR Subpart 37.6, which never mandates the use of 
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fee or price reductions for unsatisfactory performance, but simply states to, “include 
performance incentives when appropriate (FAR Subpart 37.6).”     
 In the infancy of PBSA implementation, some agencies began to rely on 
contractors to perform certain functions in such a way as to raise questions about who 
was creating Government policy, the Government or private contractors (OFPP, 1992).  
In addition, the amount of control over contract performance being transferred to 
contractors began to be questioned.  In light of this, the OFPP issued Policy Letter 92-1, 
establishing Executive Branch policy relating to service contracting and inherently 
governmental functions in order to avoid unacceptable transfer of official responsibility 
to Government contractors.  Policy 92-1 specifically defined an inherently governmental 
function as: 
[A] function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate 
performance by Government employees.  These functions include those activities 
that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or 
the making of value judgments in making decisions for the Government. (OFPP, 
1992)   
 
The policy letter noted that while certain functions, such as facility maintenance and food 
services, may be performed by contractors, other functions, such as the command of 
combat troops may not.  However, the policy letter made a point not to specify legally 
which functions are inherently governmental or define the factors used to make such a 
determination by using non-binding terminology, such as “may” or “might.”   This 
intentional lack of specifics in identifying inherently governmental functions may cause 
internal debate over the use of contractors to perform non-standard services, but it also 
allows governmental agencies the flexibility to use creative contracting methods, 
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including the use of PBSA, when acquiring services in order to meet mission 
requirements. 
 A 1993 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agency review 
revealed that service contracting practices and capabilities were uneven across the 
Executive branch (OFPP, 1994).  In response, the OFPP issued Policy Letter 93-1.  This 
policy letter established Government-wide policy, assigned responsibilities, and provided 
guiding principles for Executive Departments and agencies in managing the acquisition 
and use of services.  In addition, the policy letter uses the “best practices” concept to 
guide government agencies towards the use of a more results-oriented approach to service 
contracting.  This “best practices” concept ultimately led to the creation of FAR Subpart 
37.5, which allowed contracting officials, for the first time, legally to use practical 
techniques gained from experience to improve the procurement process (FAR Subpart 
37.5).   
 In a further attempt to encourage the use of PBSA and a more results-oriented 
approach, in 1997 the OFPP distributed a PBSA checklist in order to aid in developing 
performance-based solicitations, contracts or task orders, and to assist in determining 
whether existing solicitations, contracts, or task orders may be appropriately classified as 
performance-based (OFPP, 1997).  The checklist provides the minimum elements 
required for an acquisition to be considered PBSA.  Once again, the OFPP purposefully 
made the checklist vague and open to interpretation in order to avoid infringing on the 
authority or discretion of contracting officers.  Like FAR Subpart 37.6, the checklist 
identifies four minimum requirements for PBSA.  These requirements are: 
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(1) Performance requirements that define the work in measurable and mission-
related terms.  
(2) Performance standards tied to the performance requirements.  
(3) A Government quality assurance plan that describes how the contractor’s 
performance will be measured against the performance standards. 
(4) If the acquisition is either critical to agency mission accomplishment or 
requires relatively large expenditures of funds, positive and negative 
incentives tied to quality assurance plan measurements. 
 
Although not exactly the same, these requirements are similar to the four PBSA criteria 
identified by FAR Subpart 37.6.  Furthermore, the instructions within the checklist assert 
that the checklist is only one of many tools available to assist in the developing of PBSA 
contracts.  
 In 1998 the OFPP concluded a four year study of PBSA and published a report of 
its findings titled, “A Report on the Performance-Based Service Contracting Pilot 
Project.”  The study included twenty-six non-PBSA contracts, ranging from $100,000 to 
$325 million.  These contracts, all of which were due to expire, were resolicited using 
PBSA methods.  Before-and-after measurements were taken and the results clearly 
demonstrated PBSA’s benefits (OFPP, 1998).  According to the report, PBSA reduced 
contract prices an average of 15% at all price ranges and across all types of services.  
More importantly, PBSA was particularly effective when cost-reimbursement non-PBSA 
contracts were converted to FFP PBSA contracts.  In the forward of the report Mr. 
Franklin Raines, OMB Director, encouraged agency officials to expand the use of and 
actively promote PBSA in order to capture the potential billions of dollars in savings 
(OFPP, 1998).  Although this was yet another attempt to encourage the use of PBSA, it 
was the first influential directive supported by factual dollar savings data.  
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 In the wake of the PBSA pilot project and its significant findings, the OFPP 
rushed to issue the “Guide to Best Practices for Performance-Based Service Contracting.”  
Using the results from the PBSA pilot study as a foundation, the document contains 
suggested best practices derived from the experiences of contracting personnel in both the 
government and commercial sector.  The document is not a mandatory regulation nor is it 
a “how to” manual, but it is a tool to assist in developing policies and procedures for 
implementing PBSA (OFPP, October 1998).  
For the next few years, the Federal Government, outside of the DoD, provided 
little documented PBSA direction until March of 2001, when then OMB Deputy Director, 
Sean O’Keefe, issued a memorandum to all department heads and agencies urging them 
to make greater use of PBSA contracts.  This memorandum established a goal for FY 
2002 that, for all contract amounts over $25,000, no less than 20 percent of the total 
eligible service contracting dollars be awarded using PBSA techniques (O’Keefe, 2001).  
This marked the first officially documented PBSA goal established by the Federal 
Government, outside of the DoD. 
The first documentation to require by law that the DoD meet a goal of 50% PBSA 
of services by FY 2005 was the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 
2002, Sections 801-803.  Section 801 of the NDAA covers management of the 
procurement of services and includes the requirement for data collection; including 
service purchased, total dollars, type of contract, business size, and the extent of 
competition; Section 802 establishes DoD PBSA performance goals (United States 
Congress, 2002).  This section specifies the following minimum usage of performance 
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based purchasing using firm fixed prices for specific tasks, calculated on the basis of 
dollar value: 
For FY 2003, a percentage no less than 25 percent 
For FY 2004, a percentage no less than 35 percent 
For FY 2005, a percentage no less than 50 percent 
For FY 2011, a percentage no less than 70 percent 
 
Lastly, Section 803 discusses the use of competition in all multiple award 
contracts above $100,000, reemphasizing the need for competition in the awarding of 
service contracts, specifically PBSA contracts.  
In response to sections 801 through 803 of the NDAA for FY 2002, which 
established a series of requirements impacting the acquisition of services in the 
Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, Mr. Edward Aldridge, issued a memorandum to all secretaries of the military 
departments providing policy guidance and establishing a review structure and process 
for the acquisition of services in accordance with section 801(d) (Aldridge, 2002).  The 
attachments to this memorandum include a review of Department of Defense acquisition 
of services, which is intended to outline the review policy for the acquisition of services 
and ensure service acquisitions are based on clear, performance-based requirements, that 
required outcomes are identified and measurable, and that the acquisitions are properly 
planned and administered to achieve intended results.  
 Realizing that agencies were making only moderate progress toward PBSA 
implementation, the OFPP established a PBSA interagency working group and published 
the results and finding in a July 2003 report titled, “Interagency Task Force on 
Performance-Based Service Acquisition.”  The group was established in order to obtain a 
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broader understanding of the requirements of PBSA and to identify ways to increase 
PBSA usage (OFPP, 2003).  As a result of their findings the group recommended 
modifying the FAR in order to increase flexibility in applying PBSA, modifying 
reporting requirements to ensure appropriate PBSA application, and improving the 
quality, currency, and availability of PBSA guidance.  Although acting Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne did address 
these recommendations in an August 2003 memorandum, but as of March, 2005, none of 
the recommended modifications to the FAR have been published (Wynne, 2003).  
However, changes in reporting requirements and an increase in quality, currency, and 
availability of PBSA guidance has been implemented through the use of web-based 
technology.     
 While the OFPP and other federal government agencies were attempting to 
encourage and provide guidance for the use of PBSA within the government, the DoD 
and USAF were busy trying to align their directives and instructions with federal 
guidance in order to meet mandated PBSA requirements.  These efforts are discussed in 
the following section of the chapter.   
 
Department of Defense (DoD) and United States Air Force (USAF) Guidance 
 In an effort to promote PBSA within the Air Force acquisition and contracting 
community, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
Management published Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63-124 “Performance-Based Service 
Contracts” in 1999.  Upon its release, AFI 63-124 replaced AFM 64-108 “Service 
Contracts” and AFI 63-504 “Quality Assurance Evaluator Program” as the governing 
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guidance for service contracting.  This new AFI removed numerous mandated processes, 
empowering field personnel with the freedom needed to embrace agile acquisition and 
procurement transformation (DAF, 1999).  This AFI revolutionized the expectations and 
methods of contracting for services in the USAF and aligned Air Force guidance with the 
PBSA initiatives established by the OFPP.  This AFI was later amended in February of 
2004 by way of an Interim Change to AFI 63-124.  This interim change deleted 
Attachment 2 of AFI 63-124, the criteria for exemption to performance-based service 
contracts, leaving only the services listed under FAR Part 37.102 exempt from PBSA 
(DAF, 2004).  This change not only increases the number of services eligible for PBSA, 
but also the percentage of dollars.  At first glance, it seems as if this will help agencies 
meet PBSA goals, when in reality, it may make achievement of PBSA goals more 
difficult because more services are eligible, thus more services must be converted to 
PBSA.        
In April 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, Dr. Jacques Gansler, issued an official memorandum addressing the use of 
PBSA in the DoD.  In this memorandum Dr. Gansler stated that the use of performance-
based acquisition strategies for services was among his highest priorities (Gansler, 2000). 
This memorandum mandated that, at a minimum, 50 percent of service acquisitions, 
measured in both dollars and actions, be PBSA by FY 2005.  From the memorandum it is 
unclear whether contract modification actions for service contracts should be used for the 
purpose of PBSA percentage calculations.  At any rate, Dr. Gansler’s goal was set forth 
nearly one year before any other federally mandated PBSA goals, suggesting that the 
DoD’s implementation of PBSA was more advanced than other agencies.  In addition to 
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the goals, the memorandum outlines policy guidance, implementation planning, training 
initiatives, and other department-wide PBSA initiatives in order to help guide agencies 
towards the accomplishment the PBSA goal. 
 In response to Dr. Gansler’s requirements, the USAF issued its own “PBSA 
Implementation Plan.”  This plan provided guidance for identification of services eligible 
for PBSA including; maintenance, repair, operations and support, modifications, 
modernizations, and medical services (DAF, 2000).  More importantly, the 
implementation plan established the requirement of tracking PBSA implementation 
progress through automated systems.  This requirement of PBSA tracking is what allows 
researchers the opportunity to conduct quantitative studies and analysis on USAF 
implementation of PBSA. 
The DoD issued The Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisitions in 
the Department of Defense (PBSA Guidebook) in 2001 in order to help acquisition teams 
better understand the basic principles of PBSA, better implement performance-based 
strategies and methodologies into service acquisitions, and meet the goals set forth by Dr. 
Gansler’s 2000 memorandum (DAF, 2001).  Major topics include market research, 
developing a performance-based work statement and establishing measurable 
performance standards, incentives and remedies, contractor performance management, 
source selection considerations, and contract administration.  The PBSA Guidebook also 
identifies the following minimum elements needed in order for an acquisition to be 
considered performance-based: 
(1) Performance Work Statement – The performance work statement describes 
the requirement in terms of measurable outcomes rather than by means of 
prescriptive methods. 
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(2) Measurable Performance Standards – To determine whether performance 
outcomes have been met, measurable performance standards define what is 
considered acceptable performance. 
(3) Remedies – Remedies are procedures that address how to manage 
performance that does not meet performance standards.  While not mandatory, 
incentives should be used, where appropriate, to encourage performance that 
will exceed performance standards.  Remedies and incentives complement 
each other. 
(4) Performance Assessment Plan – This plan describes how contractor 
performance will be measured and assessed against performance standards.  
(Quality Assurance Plan or Quality Surveillance Plan).  
 
As shown in Table 1, the criteria established by the PBSA Guidebook, although not 
exactly the same, parallel PBSA criteria established by other publications. 
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Table 1.  PBSA Criteria for PBSA Guidebook, PBSA Checklist, and FAR Part 37.6 
PBSA Guidebook PBSA Checklist FAR Part 37.6 
1) The performance work 
statement describes the 
requirement in terms of 
measurable outcomes rather 
than by means of 
prescriptive methods. 
 
1) Performance 
requirements that define 
the work in measurable and 
mission related terms. 
 
1) Describe requirements 
in terms of results required 
rather than the methods of 
performance of the work. 
2) To determine whether 
performance outcomes have 
been met, measurable 
performance standards 
define what is considered 
acceptable performance. 
 
2) Performance standards 
tied to the performance 
requirements. 
 
2) Use measurable 
performance standards and 
quality assurance 
surveillance plans. 
 
 
3) Remedies are procedures 
that address how to manage 
performance that does not 
meet performance standards.  
While not mandatory, 
incentives should be used, 
where appropriate, to 
encourage performance that 
will exceed performance 
standards.  Remedies and 
incentives complement each 
other. 
 
3) A Government quality 
assurance plan that 
describes how the 
contractor's performance 
will be measured against 
the performance standards. 
 
3) Specify procedures for 
reduction of fee or 
reduction to price of a 
fixed price contract when 
services are not performed 
or do not meet contract 
requirements.   
 
4) This plan describes how 
contractor performance will 
be measured and assessed 
against performance 
standards. 
4) If the acquisition is 
either critical to agency 
mission accomplishment or 
requires relatively large 
expenditures of funds, 
positive and negative 
incentives tied to quality 
assurance plan 
measurements 
4) Include performance 
incentives when 
appropriate. 
  
 
 
Lastly, the highlight of the guidebook is the “Top-Level Guiding Principles” section that 
summarizes the 49-page document into eleven bullets, emphasizing performance based 
methods and incentives based on well-defined results-oriented requirements.   
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In early 2003, the USAF issued The Management and Oversight of Acquisition of 
Services Process (MOASP), implementing section 801 of the NDAA for FY 2002.  The 
guidance appoints the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Services (AFPEO/SV) 
(now the AFPEO for Combat & Mission Support (CM)) as the designated official to 
review all service acquisitions, except major weapon system and space program 
acquisitions (DAF, 2003).  Additionally, the guidance states that the AFPEO/SV may 
delegate management and review responsibilities to Major Command (MAJCOM) 
designated officials, which then may further delegate these authorities.  This verbiage 
becomes significant when determining what constitutes a performance-based service.  If 
such determination is delegated to different agencies within different MAJCOMs, 
inconsistencies in PBSA determinations may surface.    
In August 2003, a memorandum from the acting Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne, urged the Department of 
Defense to continue increasing the use of PBSA because such acquisitions provide 
significant benefit to the government (Wynne, 2003).  Included in the memorandum are 
interim goals he asks each military department to work towards in an effort to meet the 
goal of awarding 50 percent of all contract actions and dollars using performance-based 
specifications by FY 2005.  Mr. Wynne’s PBSA goals were; 
FY 2003 25 percent of dollars awarded 
FY 2004 35 percent of dollars awarded 
FY 2005 50 percent of dollars awarded 
 
Although these goals were not legislated, they do offer a road map for expected PBSA 
progression for all military departments, including the USAF. 
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Over the last few years it looked as if the DoD was well on its way to 
implementing PBSA and meeting mandated goals.  According to a 2002 GAO testimony 
by then Acting Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Mr. William Woods, 
about 23 percent of eligible service contracts were reported to be performance-based 
during FY 2001 (Woods, 2002).  However, in August 2003, Michael Wynne, claimed 
that the DoD is making progress towards FY 2005 goal of 50 percent of contract actions 
awarded using performance-based specifications due to the fact that in FY 2002 over 20 
percent of the service requirements were awarded using performance-based specifications 
(Wynne, 2003).  If both of these statements are correct, it shows that the DoD may have 
made minimal progress from FY 2001 to FY 2002, but still seems to have met the FY 
2003 goal of 25 percent.  However, recent research (Lacey, 2004) suggests that the FY 
2005 goal of 50% will not be met by either the DoD or the USAF.  
 
Other Literature 
 Previous research and commercial literature on PBSA is limited.  However, the 
RAND Corporation’s Project AIR FORCE division, which is an Air Force federally 
funded research and development center for studies and analysis, has conducted a few 
studies directed towards implementation, use, and effectiveness of PBSA.   
 The first study, titled, “Performance-Based Contracting in the Air Force: A 
Report on Experiences in the Field,” was completed in January 2001 and looked at 
examples of successful USAF applications of PBSA.  Twenty-two recently awarded 
contracts from “self-selected” bases that identified themselves as examples of successful 
implementation of PBSA practices were studied.  The results concluded that most bases 
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were very happy with the performance selected using PBSA practices.  However, only 
two bases attributed the success in obtaining contractor performance to the use of new 
acquisition practices.  Additionally, changes in costs resulting from PBSA practices were 
difficult to determine because a) many of the new contracts’ scope of work was different 
from the work in the old contracts, b) it is difficult to determine the accuracy of 
government cost estimates associated with an acquisition, and c) it is difficult to measure 
changes in internal costs, such as costs incurred in the preparation and administration of a 
contract using PBSA.  (Ausnik, Camm, & Cannon, 2001)   
 The second study, titled, “Implementing Performance-Based Services Acquisition 
(PBSA): Perspectives from an Air Logistics Center and a Product Center,” focused on the 
application of PBSA practices at program offices that support weapon systems, common 
subsystems, and special mission capabilities, rather than operational offices that mainly 
provide installation support services.    Unlike installation support services that are 
traditionally commercial in nature and have widely accepted performance standards, 
many services purchased by program offices have limited opportunities for performance 
evaluation and determination of successful outcomes because many of the desired results 
of a service are not always known in advance.  The study found that Air Logistic Centers 
and Product Centers are having difficulties satisfying the PBSA criteria described in AFI 
63-124 for the use of “measurable performance standards” because they interpret the 
criteria to mean that a desired result must be known in advance in order to measure 
performance.  However, research concluded that both Centers are using performance 
based approaches by successfully applying the other three criteria described in AFI 63-
124. (Ausnik, Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002) 
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Private Sector Literature  
 
 Private sector literature on performance-based service contracts is limited.  This 
may be due to the fact that in the private sector, only 5 to 20 percent of the total external 
procurement budgets are used to procure services (Barry, 2003).  This is a small 
percentage considering in FY 1999, the dollar amount spent by the DoD on services 
equaled the amount spent on supplies/systems (Gansler, 2001).  Despite, the limited 
emphasis placed on private sector procurement of services, some guidance on 
performance-based contracts outside of the DoD does exist. 
 In an Inside Supply Management article from June 2003, Jack Barry reveals that’s 
there is a private sector approach to building performance based-contracts that has been 
proven successful when contracting for several different types of services, including 
health/insurance, transportation, engineering, advertising and legal services.  The article 
illustrates that an effective performance-based contract must identify the following key 
factors for success: 
1) Baseline establishment 
2) Escalators and audits 
3) Incentives 
4) Performance measures 
 
Although not identical, these factors for success are similar to PBSA criteria identified 
for government procurement.  Baseline establishment involves the development of a 
range of acceptable performance that is based on market research and historical trends in 
the industry.  Performance should then be measured against these baselines, just as 
government PBSA contracts measure performance against established performance 
standards (Barry, 2004).  Private incentives are similar to government incentives and 
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should entice the supplier to reduce costs.  Barry notes that sharing of savings tends to be 
a strong incentive (Barry, 2004).  The only factor that truly differs from government 
PBSA guidance is escalators and audits.  Escalators include adjustment clauses that allow 
baseline prices to be readjusted upward or downward according to predetermined factors 
and indices (Barry, 2004).  Auditing simply entails reviewing documentation associated 
with adjustment of costs.    
 In 2000, a commercial advisory firm, named Stqandish Group, traveled to four 
different cities and hosted a total of 14 workshops in an attempt to explore and answer the 
question, “Will performance-based contracts increase project success and reduce waste?”  
According to Stqandish Group forecasts, commercial firms and government agencies 
wasted over $100 billion in consulting fees during 2000 (Johnson, 2000).  Although 
government agencies were included in the $100 billion figure, the firm’s study focused 
specifically on the commercial sector of contracted services.  While the study was unable 
to substantiate any of their findings quantitatively, the advisory firm did publish the 
information gathered from workgroup participants, including benefits of performance-
based contracts and how to implement them.  According to their research, implementing 
a performance-based contract is a five step process, which includes: 
 Step 1: Define project scope and objectives. 
 Step 2: Define success metrics.  
 Step 3: Establish baselines. 
 Step 4: Measure results. 
 Step 5: Implement incentives and penalties. 
 
Once again, these steps are very similar to the process used by the government when 
establishing PBSA contracts, hinting that the same methods used by the government also 
apply to commercial purchasing practices. 
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Summary 
This chapter described the literature relevant to the creation, implementation, and 
evaluation of PBSA.  Besides basic definitions and explanations of PBSA, this chapter 
explained how past policy, directives, and regulations established by the Federal 
Government, Department of Defense (DoD), and the USAF have led to the current state 
of PBSA within the USAF acquisition and contracting community.  
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III. Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology used to answer 
the question, “What are the current and expected future states of Performance Based 
Service Acquisition (PBSA) implementation in the United States Air Force (USAF)?”   
The majority of the data for this effort were extracted from the Air Force Contract 
Reporting System, also know as the J001.  The J001 is a database comprised of DD Form 
350, Individual Contracting Action Report, inputs for all Air Force contracting actions 
exceeding $25,000.  This thesis evaluates and analyzes the current and expected future 
states of PBSA implementation in the USAF, including the assessment of current 
performance against PBSA goals, the forecasting of future performance against PBSA 
goals, and the evaluation of PBSA contract characteristics.  This chapter includes the 
research problem, investigative questions, data gathering, data reliability, data analysis, 
and summary.  
 
Research Problem  
 Since Dr. Gansler, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, mandated that 50 percent of all eligible service acquisitions, measured in 
both dollars and actions, be awarded using PBSA methods by Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, 
little has been done to measure the implementation of PBSA or the progress towards Dr. 
Gansler’s goal.  In order to evaluate the performance of PBSA implementation, USAF 
decision-makers need to know the current state of PBSA in the USAF.  Furthermore, 
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USAF decisions makers need to know whether or not mandated PBSA goals have been 
and will be met.  
This study addresses the question: What is the current and future state of PBSA 
implementation in the USAF?  Several investigative questions were developed to help 
answer this research question.  The five investigative questions this study answers are: 
IQ1.  Is the J001 database, which is the source of government procurement data, 
reliable? 
IQ2.  Is the USAF meeting interim PBSA goals? 
IQ3.  Is the USAF on track to meet future mandated PBSA goals? 
IQ4.  Is the percentage of modifications coded PBSA equal to the percentage of 
non-modifications coded PBSA?   
IQ5.  Are any particular acquisition characteristics associated with PBSA use? 
IQ5a.  What are the antecedents to the use of PBSA?   
IQ5b.  What are the barriers to the use of PBSA?  
These investigative questions were answered using descriptive statistics, forecasting, 
contingency tables, and regression. 
 
Research Design 
 In order to properly address the research problem, two research designs were 
utilized in this study; a time series design using archival data and correlational research.  
A time series is a large series of observations made on the same variable consecutively 
over time (Shadish, Cook, Campbell, 2002).  For this study numerous variables were 
observed over time, with an emphasis placed on PBSA contract coding.  Just like many 
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other time series data, the data for this study came from an archive, the J001 database.  
Gaining access to archival data for research use can sometimes be difficult (Shadish, 
et.al., 2002).   However, by having a sponsor (AFMC/PK) that was willing to grant 
access to the needed archival data, the researcher was confident that obtaining data from 
the archival database would not be an issue.  This archival data extracted from the J001 
database for FY 2001 through 2004 was the foundation for answering all five 
investigative questions.  
Correlational research involves examining how differences in one characteristic 
or variable relate to differences in one or more other characteristics or variables (Leedy 
and Ormrod, 2001).  In this type of research, surface relationships are examined without 
necessarily probing for the causal reasons underlying them (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  
A correlation is deemed to exist when the increase or decrease in one variable, results in a 
predictable increase or decrease of another variable (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  Through 
the use of statistical tools, such as contingency tables and regressions, this study searched 
for correlations between PBSA and other contract variables.   
 
Data Gathering 
The majority of the data for this effort, and the data used to answer investigative 
questions two through five, were extracted from the Air Force Contract Reporting 
System, also know as the J001.  The J001 is a database comprised of DD Form 350, 
Individual Contracting Action Report, inputs for all Air Force contracting actions 
exceeding $25,000.  All DD Form 350 data that are input, collected, and transmitted is 
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considered primary data, which are often the most valid form of data (Leedy and Ormrod, 
2001).   
The data in the J001 database needed for this study was queried using Air Force 
Materiel Command’s (AFMC) Contracting Business Intelligence System (CBIS), which 
receives updates from the J001.  Identifying and extracting only the contracting actions 
that were services-related was done by isolating block B12A, Federal Stock Class (FSC) 
or Service (SVC) Code, on the DD Form 350.  FY 2001 was the first year the form DD 
350 contained a block for coding of PBSA.  On the DD Form 350, block B12A is a four 
position alphanumeric code.  All FSC codes contain only numeric designations, while all 
SVC codes start with an alpha designation.  In order to extract only the SVC coded 
contracting actions, a search was conducted for all actions where B12A was between 
A000 and Z999.  The resulting contracting actions, all of which were services-related, 
were extracted from the database and transferred to an excel document.  While highly 
unlikely, it is possible some PBSA coded contracts used FSC codes by mistake.  
However, because of the low probability of occurrence, no attempt to extract these 
contracts was made.  
Due to the size and complexity of the information contained on each DD Form 
350, not all blocks on the form were extracted for analysis.  Table 2 shows the variables 
extracted form the database.   
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Table 2.  DD Form 350 Variables Extracted from the J001 Database. 
B1A – Contract Number B13F – Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use  
B1C – Bundled Contract C1 - Synopsis 
B1D – Bundled Contract Exception C2 – Reason Not Synopsized 
B1E – Performance-Based Service Contract C3 – Extent Competed 
B3 – Action Date 
B4 – Completion Date 
C5 – Type of Contract 
C8 – Solicitation Procedures 
B6A – City or Place Code 
B8 - Obligated or Deobligated Dollars 
C9 – Authority for Other Than Full & 
Open Competition 
B10 – Multi-Year Contract C14 – Commercial Items 
B11 – Total Estimated Contract Value D1A – Type of Entity 
B12A – FSC or SVC Code D1B – Women-Owned Business 
B12D – NAICS Code D1C – HUBZone Representation  
B13A – Contract/Order D1D – Ethnic Group 
B13B – Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract D4A – Type of Set-Aside 
B13E – Multiple Award Contract Fair 
Opportunity 
D4B – Type of Preference 
D7 – SBIR Program 
 
 
The researcher first reviewed all variables for applicability to this study.  Variables were 
eliminated based not only on their pertinence to PBSA, but also their frequency of use.  
For example, Report Number and Recovered Material Clauses, were eliminated from 
consideration because both are seldom used and have no relationship to PBSA.  Next, 
variables that are typically included in contracting metrics, such as type of service, dollar 
amount, business size, and contract type, were selected for extraction.  Then I included 
socio-economic variables, such as Women-Owned Business, HUBZone Representation, 
and Ethnic Group.  While these socio-economic variables are most likely not correlated 
with the use of PBSA, they were selected in order to check for any unusual or compelling 
relationships.  Curiosity was the driver for extraction of a few variables.  On the surface 
theses variables were expected to have no correlation to PBSA.  However, no 
determination can be made until they are tested.  These variables include Multiple Award 
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Fair Opportunity, Bundled Contract, and Bundled Contract Exception.  Before finalizing 
the selection of variables, a member of the research committee reviewed and agreed that 
the variables identified by the researcher for extraction from the J001 database were 
appropriate.   
 
Variable Descriptions 
This section provides a description of possible responses and expected 
relationships to PBSA for each variable extracted from the J001 database.  This 
information was obtained from the Contract Action Reporting System FY04 Training and 
Desk Guide (Office of Procurement Management, 2003).  Because socio-economic 
variables, such as Type of Entity, Women-Owned Business, HUBZone Representation, 
Ethnic Group, Type of Set-Aside, Type of Preference, and SBIR Program, have no 
practical correlation to PBSA, no expected relationships were noted.   
Contract Number.  This is a 13-character alphanumeric designation procurement 
identification number.  This variable is used for informational purposes only and was not 
tested for relationships with PBSA. 
Bundled Contract.  This variable is coded “Y” when the contract meets the 
definition of “bundled contract” and the contract value exceeds $5 million.  This variable 
is coded “N” when code “Y” dose not apply.  This variable was expected to have a 
negative correlation with PBSA use when coded “Y” because in order for a bundled 
contract to be performance-based, a majority of the consolidated contracts would have 
also had to be performance-based.  
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Bundled Contract Exception.  If Bundled Contract is coded “N”, this variable is 
left blank; otherwise one of the following codes is entered:  
Code A – The procurement is mission critical and the agency has determined that 
the consolidation of requirements is critical to the agency’s mission. 
Code B – The agency used the OMB Circular A-76 process to determine that the 
consolidation of requirements is necessary and justified. 
Code C – Codes A and B do not apply 
 
This variable was expected to have a negative correlation with the probability of PBSA 
because it’s dependent on the coding of “Y” for Bundled Contract. 
Action Date.  The year, month, and day of fiscal obligation.  Although descriptive 
in nature, it was expected that this variable, over time, would have a positive correlation 
with PBSA.  This was expected because it was assumed that PBSA percentages were 
going to increase over time. 
Completion Date.  The year, month, and day of the last contract delivery or the 
end of the performance period.  Although descriptive in nature, it was also expected that 
this variable, over time, would have a positive correlation with PBSA.  This was expected 
because it was assumed that PBSA percentages were going to increase over time. 
Obligated or Deobligated Dollars.  This variable is the net amount of funds 
obligated or deobligated by the contracting action.  This variable was expected to have a 
positive correlation with PBSA as the value increased.  This was expected because the 
complex nature of PBSA contracts implies that the time and effort needed to establish a 
PBSA contract would not be done for smaller dollar contracts. 
Mult-Year Contract.  This variable is coded “Y” when the contracting action is a 
multi-year contract and coded “N” when code “Y” does not apply.  It was expected that 
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this variable would have no correlation with PBSA because most multi-year contracts are 
avoided when at all possible.  
Total Estimated Contract Value.  This variable is the net amount of the total 
estimated contract value at the time of the initial contract.  This includes placement of an 
indefinite-delivery or multi-year contract.  Additionally, this variable includes the total 
estimated value of orders and option anticipated over the life of the contract.  This 
variable was expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA for the same reasons 
indentified for Obligated or Deobligated Dollars.  
FSC or SVC Code.  This variable is the 4-characrter code that describes the 
contract effort.  Each effort falls into one of three categories; Supplies, Services, or 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation.  This variable was expected to have a 
positive correlation with PBSA when general base services, such as grounds maintenance 
or custodial services, were selected.  R&D services were expected to have a negative 
correlation with PBSA because of their seldom use of performance-based contracts in the 
past.   
NAICS Code.  This variable stands for the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) and also helps identify the product of service.  It is important to note 
that more than one code may apply.  This variable was expected to act similar to FSC or 
SVC Code because it is a function of the FSC or SVC Code.  
Contract/Order.  This variable is coded using one of the following eight codes: 
Code 1 - Letter Contract.  Code 1 is entered when the contracting action is a letter 
contract or a modification to a letter contract that has not been definitized. 
Code 3 - Definitive Contract.  Code 3 is entered when the contracting action is the 
award or modification of a definitive contract or a modification that definitizes a 
contract.  
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Code 4 - Order under an Agreement.  Code 4 is entered when the contracting 
action is an order or definitization of an order under an agreement other than a 
blanket purchase agreement.   
Code 5 - Order under Indefinite-Delivery Contract.  Code 5 is entered when the 
contracting action is an order, including a task or delivery order, under an 
indefinite-delivery contract awarded by a Federal agency, such as a GSA 
indefinite-delivery contract. 
Code 6 - Order under Federal Schedule.  Code 6 is entered when the contracting 
action is an order under a GSA or VA Federal Supply Schedule, or a call against a 
blanket purchase agreement established under a GSA or VA Federal Supply 
Schedule. 
Code 7 – Blanket Purchase Agreement Order under Federal Schedule.  Code 7 is 
entered when the contracting action is a BPA order under a GSA or VA Federal 
Supply Schedule. 
Code 8 - Order from Procurement List.  Code 8 is entered when the contracting 
action is an action placed with Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) or a JWOD 
Participating Nonprofit Agency.  
Code 9 - Award under FAR Part 13.  Code 9 is entered when the contracting 
action, including an action in a designated industry group under the Small 
Business Competitiveness Demonstration Program, is an award using simplified 
acquisition procedures. 
 
This variable was expected to have negative correlation with PBSA when coded “4”, “5”, 
“6”, “7”, or “8.”  This was expected because PBSA contracts are rarely used when 
placing an order off of an existing contract. 
Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract.  This variable is coded using one of the 
following three codes when Contract/Order is coded “Order” for the variable Indefinite-
Delivery Contract: 
Code A – The action pertains to a requirements contract. 
Code B – The action pertains to an indefinite-quantity contract. 
Code C – The action pertains to a definite-quantity contract. 
 
Because indefinite delivery contracts are seldom PBSA, it was expected that this variable 
would have a negative correlation with PBSA use. 
Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity.  This variable is coded using one of 
the following five codes: 
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Code A - Fair Opportunity Process.  Code A is entered when the delivery or task 
order was issued pursuant to a process that permitted each contract awardee a fair 
opportunity to be considered. 
Code B - Urgency.  Code B is entered when the agency need is so urgent that 
providing a fair opportunity would result in unacceptable delays. 
Code C - One/Unique Source.  Code C is entered when only one contract awardee 
is capable of providing the supplies or services at the level or quality required 
because the supplies or services are unique or highly specialized. 
Code D - Follow-On Contract.  Code D is entered when the order was issued on a 
sole-source basis in the interest of economy and efficiency as a logical follow-on 
to an order already issued under the contract. 
Code E - Minimum Guarantee.  Code E is entered when it was necessary to place 
an order to satisfy a minimum amount guaranteed to the contractor. 
 
This variable was expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA when “A” was 
coded because, according to the literature, PBSA increases competition, thus enhancing 
fair opportunity processes.   
Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use.  This variable is coded using one of the four 
following codes if Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract was coded and the action is the 
initial placement of an indefinite-delivery contract: 
Code A – The contract can be used Government-wide. 
Code B – The contract can be used within the DoD only. 
Code C – The contract can be used within the department only. 
Code D – The contract can be used by the contracting office only.  
 
Because indefinite delivery contracts are seldom PBSA, it was expected that this variable 
would have a negative correlation with PBSA use. 
Synopsis.  This variable is coded using one of the three following codes: 
Code A – Only a synopsis of the proposed action was prepared. 
Code B – A combined synopsis/solicitation of the proposed action was prepared. 
Code N – A synopsis was not prepared. 
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This variable was expected to have a negative correlation with PBSA when coded “N” 
because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstances.  Not preparing a synopsis limits 
the notification of upcoming solicitations, thus limiting competition. 
Reason Not Synopsized.  This variable is left blank unless Synopsis is coded “N.”  
If Synopsis is coded “N” then this variable is coded using one of the three following 
codes: 
Code A – The action was not synopsized due to urgency. 
Code B – The action was not synopsized because the acquisition was made 
through another means that provided access to the notice of the proposed action 
through a single, Government-wide point of entry. 
Code Z – The action was not synopsized due to some other reason.  
 
This variable was expected to have a negative correlation with PBSA because not 
synopsizing results in limited competition. 
Extent Competed.  This variable is coded using one of the four following codes: 
Code A – The action was competed. 
Code B – The action is not available for competition. 
Code C – The action is a follow-on to competed action. 
Code D – The action was not competed. 
 
Because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstance, codes “A” and “C” for this 
variable were expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA and codes “B” and “D” 
were expected to have a negative correlation.   
Type of Contract.  This variable identifies the type of contract utilized for the 
action and is coded using one of the 12 following codes: 
Code A - Fixed-Price Redetermination.  
Code J - Firm-Fixed-Price.  
Code K - Fixed-Price Economic Price Adjustment.  
Code L - Fixed-Price Incentive.  
Code M - Fixed-Price-Award-Fee.  
Code R - Cost-Plus-Award-Fee.  
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Code S - Cost Contract.  
Code T - Cost-Sharing.  
Code U - Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee.  
Code V - Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee.  
Code Y - Time-and-Materials.  
Code Z - Labor-Hour. 
 
It was expected that this variable would have a positive correlation with PBSA when 
coded “J” because firm-fixed price contracts have been identified in the literature as the 
ideal contract types for PBSA.  Conversely, all the cost-plus contract types were expected 
to have a negative correlation with PBSA because the use of these types of contracts is 
discouraged and not conducive to PBSA methods.   
Solicitation Procedures.  This variable is left blank if the action is pursuant 
simplified acquisition procedures or is an order or call under a Federal schedule.  
Otherwise, the variable is coded using one of the following nine codes: 
Code A - Full and Open Competition Sealed Bid.  
Code B - Full and Open Competition--Competitive Proposal.  
Code C - Full and Open Competition--Combination.  
Code D - Architect-Engineer.  
Code E - Basic Research.  
Code F - Multiple Award Schedule.  
Code G - Alternative Sources. 
Code K - Set-Aside. 
Code N - Other than Full and Open Competition.  
 
Because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstance, codes “B” and “C” for this 
variable were expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA and code “N” was 
expected to have a negative correlation.  Additionally, PBSA is not appropriate for sealed 
bidding and is not required for architect-engineering services; therefore codes “A” and 
“D” were also expected to have a negative correlation with PBSA. 
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Authority for Other Than Full and Open Competition.  This variable is left blank 
unless Solicitation Procedures is coded “N.”  If Solicitation Procedures is coded “N” then 
one of the following 14 codes is used: 
Code 1A - Unique Source.  
Code 1B - Follow-On Contract. 
Code 1C - Unsolicited Research Proposal.  
Code 1D - Patent or Data Rights.  
Code 1E - Utilities.  
Code 1F - Standardization.  
Code 1G - Only One Source--Other.  
Code 2A - Urgency.  
Code 3A - Particular Sources.  
Code 4A - International Agreement.  
Code 5A - Authorized by Statute.  
Code 5B - Authorized Resale.  
Code 6A - National Security.  
Code 7A - Public Interest.  
 
Because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstance this variable was expected to 
have a negative correlation with PBSA.   
Commercial Items.  This variable is coded “Y” for yes or “N” for no depending 
on the inclusion of FAR clause 52.212-4, Contract Terms and Conditions—Commercial 
Items, in the contract.  If this clause is in the contract then the action was awarded as a 
commercial item and thus is code “Y.”  Because commercial items cover such a broad 
range of services, the researcher was unsure what effect, if any, this variable would have 
on PBSA.  
Type of Entity.  This variable describes the type of business entity the action was 
awarded to and is coded using one of the following 11 codes: 
Code A - Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB) Performing in U.S.  
Code B - Other Small Business (SB) Performing in U.S. 
Code C - Large Business Performing in U.S.  
Code D - JWOD Participating Nonprofit Agency.  
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Code F - Hospital.  
Code L - Foreign Concern or Entity.  
Code M - Domestic Firm Performing Outside U.S.  
Code T - Historically Black College or University (HBCU).  
Code U - Minority Institution (MI).  
Code V - Other Educational.  
Code Z - Other Nonprofit. 
 
Women-Owned Business.  This variable identifies whether or not the contractor 
identifies themselves as a women-owned business and is coded “Y” for yes, “N” for no, 
or “U” for uncertified. 
HUBZone Representation.  This variable identifies whether or not the contractor 
represented that it is a HUBZone small business concern and is coded “Y” for yes and 
“N” for no.   
Ethnic Group.  This variable identifies the ethnic group for the contractor, if 
applicable.  This variable is left blank unless the action is with a small disadvantaged 
business.  Otherwise one of the following seven codes is used: 
Code A - Asian-Indian American. 
Code B - Asian-Pacific American. 
Code C - Black American.  
Code D - Hispanic American.  
Code E - Native American.  
Code F - Other SDB Certified or Determined by SBA.  
Code Z - No Representation. 
 
Type of Set-Aside.  This variable identifies the type of set-aside used and is coded 
using one of the following 11 codes: 
Code A - None.  
Code B - Total SB Set-Aside.  
Code C - Partial SB Set-Aside. 
Code D - Section 8(a) Set-Aside or Sole Source. 
Code E - Total SDB Set-Aside.  
Code F - HBCU or MI - Total Set-Aside. 
Code G - HBCU or MI - Partial Set-Aside.  
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Code H - Very Small Business Set-Aside.  
Code J - Emerging Small Business Set-Aside.  
Code K - HUBZone Set-Aside or Sole Source. 
Code L - Combination HUBZone and 8(a). 
 
Type of Preference.  This variable identifies the type pf preference given to small 
businesses and is coded using one of the following five codes: 
Code A - None.  
Code B - SDB Price Evaluation Adjustment--Unrestricted.  
Code C - SDB Preferential Consideration--Partial SB Set-Aside.  
Code D - HUBZone Price Evaluation Preference.  
Code E - HUBZone Price Evaluation Preference and SDB Price Evaluation 
Adjustment. 
 
SBIR Program.   This variable identifies whether or not the action is related to the 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program and if so, what phase of it.  This 
variable is coded using the following four codes: 
Code A - Not a SBIR Program Phase I, II, or III. 
Code B - SBIR Program Phase I Action. 
Code C - SBIR Program Phase II Action. 
Code D - SBIR Program Phase III Action. 
 
 
 
Data Reliability  
Despite its wide use, the J001 and other federal procurement databases have been 
proven to have their flaws.  A 2003 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
noted, “FPDS data are inaccurate and incomplete (Woods, 2003).”  For instance, in the 
2001 review the GAO found that the value of contracts awarded to HUBZone firms could 
have been hundreds of millions of dollars different than reported (Woods, 2003).  They 
also found instances where multiple orders were reported as a single transaction.  For 
instance, an order reported as $11,443,000 should have been reported as 87 separate 
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actions at or below $25,000 (Woods, 2003).  Because of these inaccuracies, the GAO has 
been unable to assess the implementation of procurement programs and limited its 
reliance on FPDS data.  The GAO found similar inaccuracies with the Department of 
Defense’s data system, which feeds information into FPDS.  However, in the report no 
details were given on the specifics of the DoD’s inaccuracies.   
Of the problems noted in the GAO findings, none specifically pertained to the use 
or coding of PBSA.  The only remark suggesting possible problems with proper coding 
of PBSA actions included, “In some cases, those processing the data did not have a 
complete understanding of the information requirements.”  This remark suggests that 
some contracting actions may or may not be being coded PBSA accurately.  Another 
GAO report further supports the possibility of inappropriate coding of federal 
procurement data by noting there are inconsistencies in the interpretation of the definition 
of performance based contracts (Woods, 2002).  In addition, personal experiences by the 
researcher suggest that time constraints, pressure to meet procurement goals, and a 
general lack of emphasis on proper coding may also attribute to inaccuracies in the 
databases. 
Builders of the input system for the DD Form 350 realized that there was a 
possibility for user error when inputting procurement information. In order to counter 
this, the system has built-in error checking capability.  For instance, if block B1C, 
Bundled Contract, is coded “N” for no, the system will not allow you to code an 
exception in block B1D, Bundled Contract Exception.  Although this coding check 
capability does not account for subjective coding decisions, it does add to the overall 
reliability of the data.  
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Data Analysis 
AFI 63-124, the guiding document for USAF PBSA, states that all services 
contracts over the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT), which has been listed at 
$100,000 during the years pertaining to this study, are eligible for PBSA, excluding the 
services listed in FAR Subpart 37.102 (DAF, 2004).  The services excluded from PBSA 
use include architect-engineering services, construction, utility services, and services that 
are identical to supply purchases (FAR Part 37).  Because these services are not eligible 
for PBSA and none of them were coded PBSA, they were removed from the J001 data by 
identifying and deleting the corresponding service code categories.  All services, with the 
exception of R&D type services, and construction work are broken up into the 23 major 
categories listed in Appendix A.  Each category has been assigned a four position code, 
also known as SVC code, starting with a letter followed by three numbers.  The letter 
identifies the major category and the numbers identify the specific service within each 
category.  All contracts that have a SVC code that begins with the alpha designation “C” 
are architect and engineering service contracts.  All contracts that have a SVC code that 
begins with the alphanumeric designations “S1” are utility service contracts.  All 
contracts that have a SVC code that begins with the alpha designation “Y” are 
construction contracts.  Accordingly, all actions where block B12A, FSC or SVC, began 
with C, S1, or Y were removed.  After removing all exempt services, the remaining 
contracting actions, all of which were greater than $100K and not excluded under FAR 
Subpart 37.102, were analyzed.  
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The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, forecasting, regression, and 
contingency tables.  The following sections describe how these methods were used to 
answer the five investigative questions.   
Investigative Question 1.  In order to determine the reliability of the J001, and 
answer investigative question 1, a stratified random sample of PBSA contract files were 
obtained from three different contracting offices located at Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base (WPAFB).  These offices included 88 ABW/PK, AFRL Det 1/PK, and ASC/PK.  
These three offices were selected because they each perform a different contracting 
function for the USAF.  The 88th ABW/PK is an operational contracting squadron that 
primarily supports base operations; ASC/PK supports a variety of weapon systems 
related requirements, and AFRL Det 1/PK contracts primarily for research and 
development (R&D) efforts.  Together these offices handle a wide variety of contracts, 
from standard firm fixed price base custodial contracts to complex cost reimbursable 
R&D contracts to major weapon-system related contracts.   
The goal was to evaluate at least 30 randomly selected contracts from each office.  
In order to ensure an appropriate amount of contracts were selected from each office, the 
contracts were first stratified.  Using the data from the J001, all PBSA coded contract 
data from each office was identified using each office’s unique Department of Defense 
Activity Address Code (DoDAAC) and office code.  The DoDAAC is an alpha numeric 
designation that is always the first six designations of a contract number and is usually 
the same for all contracts in a particular office.  The office code is a unique alpha numeric 
designation identifier that helps track actions performed by a particular office and is 
required when completing a form DD 350. 
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Once the contract data for each office was identified, extracted, and sorted by date 
of action, a random sample for each office was generated using a random number 
generator software program tool.  Those contracts randomly selected were requested for 
review.  In some instances the contracting offices were unable to locate a contract file 
because they were a) already staged away in storage at a different location, b) currently 
being used, c) classified, or d) simply unable to be located.  In these instances, a 
replacement contract from the randomized list was identified and substituted. 
The stratified sample of service contracts coded PBSA in the J001 was then 
evaluated against the four PBSA contract criteria identified in The Guidebook for 
Performance-Based Services Acquisitions in the Department of Defense (PBSA 
Guidebook).  The criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook were selected in lieu of the 
four PBSA criteria identified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) because, 
unlike the FAR, the PBSA Guidebook criteria is a minimum mandatory requirement and 
was published by Dr. Gansler, the same person that established the FY 2005 goal that 
50% of all services be performance based.  According to the PBSA Guidebook, in order 
for an acquisition to be considered performance-based, it must meet the following 
minimum requirements: 
(1) Performance Work Statement – The performance work statement describes 
the requirement in terms of measurable outcomes rather than by means of 
prescriptive methods. 
(2) Measurable Performance Standards – To determine whether performance 
outcomes have been met, measurable performance standards define what is 
considered acceptable performance. 
(3) Remedies – Remedies are procedures that address how to manage 
performance that does not meet performance standards.  While not mandatory, 
incentives should be used, where appropriate, to encourage performance that 
will exceed performance standards.  Remedies and incentives complement 
each other. 
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(4) Performance Assessment Plan – This plan describes how contractor 
performance will be measured and assessed against performance standards.  
(Quality Assurance Plan or Quality Surveillance Plan).  
 
All evaluations were conducted by the researcher, who is Level II Certified in 
Contracting through the Acquisition Professional Development Program, and considered 
a subject matter expert in PBSA.  For the purposes of this study, contracts were evaluated 
on the existence of the four PBSA factors mentioned above.  A contract was determined 
to be correctly coded PBSA if it contained all four PBSA criteria, even if not named 
exactly as stated in the PBSA Guidebook.  For instance, a Statement of Work (SOW) that 
described the requirement in terms of measurable outcomes was considered to meet the 
first criteria of the PBSA Guidebook, even though it was not named a Performance Work 
Statement (PWS).   A contract was determined to be incorrectly coded PBSA if it did not 
meet one or more of the four PBSA criteria.  Because determining when performance 
incentives are appropriate is so subjective and the use of incentives is so infrequent, the 
third PBSA criterion, “Remedies,” was assumed to have been correctly applied for all 
PBSA contracts.   
Additionally, all PBSA coded contracts from AFRL were evaluated, not using the 
criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook, but using the determinations made in AFRL’s 
Management and Oversight of Acquisition of Services Processes (MOASP).  Prior to 
May 7, 2004, all Research and Development (R&D) contracts had followed the 
requirements for supplies (AFRL, 2004).  However, because AFRL’s R&D requirements 
are inherently performance-based, they drafted their own MOASP describing how they 
meet the principles of AFI 63-124.  AFRL’s MOASP was approved by the Air Force 
Program Executive Officer for Combat & Mission Support (AFPEO/CM) and authority 
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to act as the Designation Official for the management and oversight of all services 
acquisitions within AFRL was delegated to the AFRL commander.  Therefore, as of May 
7 2004, all AFRL R&D contracts are considered services and coded PBSA in accordance 
with the approved AFRL MOASP.  (DAF, AFRL MOASP, 2003) 
Under the AFRL MOASP, R&D contracts meet the principles of AFI 63-124 
because: 
1) Contractor written SOWs in response to Government issued objectives, 
describe work in terms of what the required output is rather than how the work 
is to be performed. 
2) Oversight between the objective and outcome is accomplished through the 
selection of appropriate reporting requirements, such as Contract Data 
Requirements Lists (CDRLs), Program Management Reviews (PMRs), 
Technical Management Reviews (TMRs), electronic management information 
systems, and interaction between the contractor and the government. 
3) Deliverables may be final reports, prototypes, other hardware or software, etc.  
  
The sample of AFRL contract files were evaluated against these criteria in the same 
manner the other offices’ contracts were evaluated.   
 Lastly, all PBSA service contracts for Contractor Engineering and Technical 
Services (CETS) covered by AFI 21-110, Engineering and Technical Services, were 
evaluated in accordance with Supplement 1 to AFI 63-124, which states that the 
surveillance requirements of AFI 63-124 do not apply (DAF, Sup 1, 1999).  AFMC 
MOASP dated February 2004 rescinded this exception.  Therefore, all CETS contracts 
prior to February 2004 were evaluated on only one criteria; the existence of a 
performance work statement that described the requirement in terms of measurable 
outcomes rather than by means of prescriptive methods. 
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Once the contract evaluations were complete, a large sample, one-tailed test about 
a population proportion was used to statistically test the reliability of the sample and 
answer the question of whether PBSA coded contracts are coded consistent with the 
minimum mandatory criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook (McClave, et al., 2001).  
Ideally all PBSA contracts would be coded correctly.  However, like any other process 
there are bound to be mistakes, or defects, in coding of contracts.  Because of this, an 
acceptable threshold was established. The researcher felt that PBSA coding could be 
considered reliable if less than 10% of the PBSA contracts were coded incorrectly.   
Inferences about population proportion, or percentages, can be made in the 
context of the probability, p, of success or failure for a binomial distribution (McClave, et 
al., 2001).  For this study p represented the percentage of PBSA contracts that did not 
meet the mandatory minimum criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook.  Additionally, 
po represented the hypothesized percentage of PBSA contracts that did not meet the 
mandatory minimum criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook and was equal to .10. 
The sample proportion is simply the sample mean of the outcomes of the trials.  
According to the Central Limit Theorem, the sample mean is approximately normally 
distributed for large samples.  Therefore, the standard normal z was able to be used for 
the test statistic: 
 Test Statistic: z = Sample proportion – Null hypothesized proportion  
    Standard deviation of sample proportion 
     
    = 
ˆ o
p̂
p p
σ
 −
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The symbol
p̂σ equals
pq
n
, where pq is estimated by poqo, qo = 1 - po, and n is the sample 
size.  
However, before conducting any type of hypothesis test, the researcher had to 
check to determine whether the sample size was large enough to use the normal 
approximation for the sampling distribution of the sample proportion, (McClave, et al., 
2001).  In order to use the large sample test of hypothesis about a population proportion, 
the sample size must be large enough that interval p
p̂
o ± 3 p̂σ does not include 0 or 1.  This 
ensures that the sample size is large enough to assume that the normal distribution will 
provide a reasonable approximation of (McClave, et al., 2001).  As long as this interval 
is completely contained in the interval 0 to 1, the normal approximation for the sampling 
distribution of is reasonable.  If at least 30 samples from each of the three offices were 
evaluated, the total number of samples, n, would be equal to 90.  With 90 samples and a 
p
p̂
p̂
o of .10, interval po ± 3 p̂σ  equals .10 ± .095 or (.005 and .195), both of which do not 
include 0 or 1.   
 Finally, in order to statistically test the reliability of the DD Form 350 data and 
answer the question of whether or not PBSA coded contracts are coded consistent with 
the minimum mandatory criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook, the following null 
and alternate hypotheses were established (Bain and Englehardt, 1987): 
Null hypothesis #1 (Ho1): p ≥ .10   
Alternate hypothesis #1 (Ha1): p < .10   
For this test an alpha (α) of .01 was used.  α represents the significance level, or the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true, also known as a Type I 
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error (McClave, et al., 2001).  Using the standard normal distribution, the appropriate 
rejection region for the specified value of α was found.  Using α = .01, the one-tailed 
rejection region is: 
 Rejection region: z < -z.01 = -2.33 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected if the value of the test statistic, z, was less 
than -2.33, thus falling in the rejection region. 
Investigative Question 2.  In order to answer investigative question 2, the 
following hypotheses were established: 
Null hypothesis #2 (Ho2):  The USAF is meeting interim PBSA goals. 
Alternate hypothesis #2 (Ha2):  The USAF is not meeting interim PBSA goals. 
 
The actual percentage of eligible dollars awarded using PBSA were compared to 
the interim PBSA goals established by the acting Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne.  Mr. Wynne’s goals did not 
address the percentage of actions PBSA, only the percentage of dollars PBSA.  These 
interim PBSA goals are included below.  
FY 2003 25 percent of dollars awarded 
FY 2004 35 percent of dollars awarded 
 
The following sub-hypotheses were established in order to address the goals for 
each FY and assist in determining whether to accept or reject null hypothesis #2:  
Null hypothesis #2a (Ho2a):  FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 25 %. 
Alternate hypothesis #2a (Ha2a):  FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 25%. 
Null hypothesis #2b (Ho2b):  FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 35 %. 
Alternate hypothesis #2b (Ha2b):  FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 35%. 
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Because the data represents the whole population of PBSA eligible contracts, if during 
any year the actual percentage of eligible dollars awarded using PBSA were less than the 
interim PBSA goals then the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Investigative Question 3.   Forecasting using simple linear regression and a two-
period moving average were used in order to answer investigative question 3.  Because 
the number of data points (4) was limited, the researcher opted to use more than one 
forecasting method.  Despite the use of two forecasting methods, the significance of the 
forecasts was expected to be limited due to the few data points available.  
With simple linear regression a straight-line model is used to relate a times series, 
Yt, to time, t (McClave, et al., 2001).  For this study Yt was the percentage of PBSA 
dollars or actions and t was the FY.  Using this model, a least squares line can be 
calculated and used to forecast future values of Yt (McClave, et al., 2001).  The straight-
line model is as follows: 
E(Yt) = β0 + β1t  
Where β0 is the intercept and β1 is a population parameter.  This model can be 
fitted using the method of least squares, where the sum of squared errors between the 
predicted and actual values is smaller than any other straight-line model (McClave, et al., 
2001).  The least squares model looks identical to the straight-line model, except for least 
square estimators are substituted for the population parameters.  The least square model is 
as follows: 
E(Yt) = β̂ 0 + β̂ 1t  
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Moving averages forecast for future time periods using the mean of past 
observations (Makridakis, Wheelwright, & McGee, 1978).  With a two-period moving 
average, only the mean of the last two observations is use to forecast for the value of the 
next time period (Makridakis, Wheelwright, & McGee, 1978).  For this study, the mean 
of the percentages for FY 2003 and 2004 will be used to forecast the percentage for FY 
2005. 
Using the simple liner regression model, moving averages, and the following 
hypotheses, the researcher forecasted for the percentage of PBSA dollars and actions for 
FY 2005:   
Null hypothesis #3 (Ho3):  The USAF will meet the mandated FY 2005 goal of 
50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA. 
Alternate hypothesis #3 (Ha3):  The USAF will not meet the mandated FY 2005 
goal of 50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA. 
 
Null hypothesis #3a (Ho3a):  The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA ≥ 50%  
Alternate hypothesis #3a (Ha3a):  The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA < 50% 
 
Null hypothesis #3b (Ho3b):  The FY 2005 % of action PBSA ≥ 50% 
Alternate hypothesis #3b (Ha3b):  The FY 2005 % of actions PBSA < 50% 
 
If either forecasted percentage of dollars or actions PBSA for FY 2005 was less than 
50%, then the null sub-hypothesis was rejected.  If any of the null sub-hypotheses were 
rejected then null hypothesis #4 was also rejected. 
Investigative Question 4.  In order to answer investigative question 4, the 
following hypotheses were established: 
Null hypothesis #4A (Ho4 dollars):  The percentage of modifications, measured in 
dollars, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in 
dollars, coded PBSA.   
Alternate hypothesis #4A (Ha4 dollars):  The percentage of modifications, measured 
in dollars, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications, 
measured in dollars, coded PBSA.   
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Null hypothesis #4B (Ho4 actions):  The percentage of modifications, measured in 
actions, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in 
actions, coded PBSA. 
Alternate hypothesis #4B (Ha4 actions):  The percentage of modifications, measured 
in actions, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications, 
measured in actions, coded PBSA.   
 
Because the whole population was used when computing the percentages, there was no 
need to use a statistical test to determine a difference between modifications and non-
modifications.  The researcher decided that a 5 percent difference of either dollars or 
actions in any FY was significant.  Therefore, the decision to accept or reject the null 
hypothesis was determined by comparing the percentage of modifications coded PBSA to 
the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA for FY 2001 through FY 2004.  In 
order to make this comparison, the following sub-hypotheses were established for each 
FY: 
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
 
If the difference for any year was greater than 5 percent, then the null hypothesis for that 
year was rejected.  If any of the null sub-hypotheses were rejected then null hypothesis #4 
was also rejected.   
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Investigative Question 5.  Contingency tables and logistic regression were used to 
answer investigative question 5.  However, before running any analysis, the variables 
extracted from the J001 database were evaluated on their likeliness of producing 
significant correlational results.  Immediately, three variables were eliminated from 
further analysis because their data is primarily descriptive in nature.  These variables 
were Action Date, Completion Date, and City or Place Code.  All remaining variables 
were analyzed.     
All nominal variables were tested for dependency with PBSA using contingency 
tables.  Contingency tables are a statistical model used for multi-nomial data and provide 
a determination of dependence (McClave, et al., 2001).  Therefore, the two continuous 
variables in the data set, Obligated or Deobligated Dollars and Total Estimated Contract 
Value, were not tested using this statistical tool.  Contingency tables provide observed 
counts of occurrences, expected counts of occurrences, frequencies for each cell, row, 
and column, probabilities for each cell, row, and column.  Contingency tables are 
constructed by listing all the possible outcomes of one variable as rows in a table and the 
possible outcomes of the other variable as columns, then finding the frequency and 
probability for each cell. The cell frequencies and probabilities are then summed across 
both rows and columns. The sums are placed in the margins, the values of which are 
called marginal frequencies and marginal probabilities (McClave, et al., 2001). The lower 
right hand corner value contains the sum of the row and column marginal frequencies and 
marginal probabilities.  The sum of the marginal frequencies must be equal to N, the total 
number of trials, and the sum of the marginal probabilities must be equal to 1 (McClave, 
et al., 2001).  Conservative sources maintain that cells that have an expected value of 5 or 
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less must be removed because they will cause inconsistencies in the table (McClave et al., 
2001).  However, others (Cochran, 1954) maintain that data does not need to be removed 
as along as at least 80% of the expected cell counts are 5 or more and no expected cell 
count is less than 1.  
The chi-square (χ2) statistic is a test statistic used to analyze count data (McClave, 
et al., 2001)  Using χ2, a determination of dependency between two classifications can be 
made (McClave, et al., 2001).  For this study the two classifications were the contract 
variable PBSA and a particular contract variable of interest.  Each contract variable, or 
classification, was tested against PBSA in order to determine dependency.  If the two 
variables are dependent, knowing one should increase the probability of knowing the 
other.  In order to test for dependency, the following hypotheses were established:  
Null hypothesis #6 (Ho6):  Variable “x” and PBSA are independent   
Alternate hypothesis #6 (Ha6):  Variable “x” and PBSA are dependent 
 
The test was conducted for each nominal variable.  However, before accepting or 
rejecting the null hypothesis, a chi-square alpha (χ2α) needed to be established.  For this 
test an alpha of .01 was used.  The next thing needed in determining χ2α was the degrees 
of freedom (df).  The following equation was used to calculate the df for each variable: 
df = (r-1)(c-1)  
Where r equals the number of rows and c equals the number of columns in the 
contingency table.  Using a χ2 table, a χ2α for each variable was established based on each 
variable’s df and an α of .01.  Finally, χ2 and χ2α were compared.  If χ2 was greater than 
χ2α the null hypothesis of independence was rejected and the alternate hypothesis of 
dependence was accepted.  (McClave, et al., 2001) 
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Lastly, it is important to note that while contingency tables can determine 
dependency between two classifications, they do not establish the extent of the 
dependency or the existence of a causal relationship between the two classifications 
(McClave, et al., 2001). 
The continuous variables and all the variables that were found to be dependent 
with PBSA using contingency tables were further analyzed using logistic regression.  
Logistic, also known as categorical, regression is performed when data is both 
quantitative and qualitative in nature and the dependent variable has only two possible 
outcomes (binary) (McClave, et al., 2001).  The dependent variable in this study, which is 
whether a contract action is PBSA, is qualitative and has only two possible outcomes, 
“Y” for yes or “N” for no.  It is common to use the terms success and failure for these 
types of binary responses (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).  With the exception of Obligated or 
Deobligated Dollars and Total Estimated Contract Value, all other independent variables 
are qualitative and can be described in binary or multi-nomial form.       
When the dependent variable is binary, the probability, p, that the dependent 
variable, y, is response level j is estimated by dividing the total sample count, n, into the 
total of each response level nj, and is written: 
Pj=nj/n 
This model serves the same role for a binary response as the sample mean does for 
continuous models.  (McClave, et al., 2001) 
 Ordinary least squares regression models the mean of the response variable.  With 
a binary response variable, the model describes how the proportion of successes depends 
on the independent variables (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).  Pi (π) usually denotes the true 
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proportion of successes and also represents the probability that a randomly selected 
subject has a success response that varies according to the dependent variables (Agresti 
and Finlay, 1997).  The logistic regression model is: 
  Log (π /(1- π)) = α + β X + ε 
Where [π /(1- π)] is the odds ratio, α is the intercept, β is the parameter of the dependent 
variable, X, and ε is the error.  In this model, as π increases from 0 to 1, the odds ratio 
increases from 0 to ∞ and the logit increases from -∞ to ∞ (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).  
Additionally, a π value greater than .5 has a positive logit value and π values less than .5 
have a negative logit value (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).   
The null hypothesis that β = 0 and the independent variable, X, has no effect on 
the probability, π, of a success, can be tested using either a z test statistic, which is the 
estimate of β divided by the standard error, or the square of the z statistic, which is called 
the Wald statistic (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).  The Wald statistic can be used in this 
instance because it has a χ2 distribution with df = 1 and and the same P-value as the z 
statistic.  Rejection of the null hypothesis results in acceptance of the alternate hypothesis 
that β ≠ 0.  In order to test each variable in this study, the following hypotheses were 
established: 
Null hypothesis #5 (Ho5):  The parameter for variable “x” equals zero.  
Alternate hypothesis #5 (Ha5):  The parameter for variable “x” does not equal 
zero. 
 
The determination to accept or reject the null hypothesis was based on each computed χ2 
and corresponding α value.  For this test, the significance level was set at .01.    
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 Another test frequently used is the likelihood-ratio test.  This test can be used to 
compare two models by testing that the extra parameters in the complete model equal 
zero (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).  Negative log-likelihood is the negative sum of logs of 
the observed probabilities.  The negative log-likelihood plays the same role as sums of 
squares does for continuous data, but for categorical data (Agresti and Finlay, 1997). 
Twice the value of the negative log-likelihood (-loglikelihood) also has a distribution that 
is approximately a χ2 distribution (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).  Therefore, the χ2 test can be 
used to test the null hypothesis that removing all the variables from the model leaves the 
likelihood of observing the sample unchanged. This test is analogous to the F-test for R2 
in multiple regression which tests whether or not the improvement in the model 
associated with the additional variables is statistically significant (Agresti and Finlay, 
1997).  If we are able to reject the null hypothesis, we have evidence that at least one of 
the variables does have an effect on the response. 
R2 (U), the uncertainty coefficient, measures the total uncertainty that is attributed 
to the model and is calculated using the following formula: 
  R2 (U) = log ( )
log ( )
likelihood difference
likelihood reduced
−
−
 
Negative log-likelihood (difference) is the difference between the likelihood using the 
full model and the likelihood using a model with no variables.  Negative log-likelihood 
(reduced) is likelihood using no variables in the model.  R2 (U)  values must be between 0 
and 1.  An R2 (U) of 1 means that the factor completely predicts the categorical response; 
an R2 (U)  of 0 means there is no gain by using the model over using fixed responses 
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(McClave, et al., 2001).  It is important to note that high R2 (U) values are rare in 
categorical models (JMP, 2003).   
 
Validity and Reliability 
 Validity and reliability of a measurement instrument influence the probability that 
you will obtain statistical significance in your data analysis, and the extent to which you 
can draw meaningful conclusions from your data (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  While 
efforts were made to make this study as valid and reliable as possible, there are still some 
validity and reliability concerns. 
 The validity pertains to the accuracy, meaningfulness, and credibility of the 
research effort as a whole (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  Most texts separate validity into 
two categories; internal and external.   
Internal validity is the extent to which a researcher can draw an accurate 
conclusion about relationships within the data based on the research design (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2001).  Because the data from the J001 was not personally gathered, but rather 
queried from an existing database, there is little that can be done to counter any internal 
validity concerns, the largest being construct validity.  Construct validity is the extent to 
which an instrument measures a characteristic that cannot be directly observed, but must 
be inferred (Leedy and Ormrod, pg 98).  Personal experience by the researcher suggests 
that time constraints, pressure to meet procurement goals, and a general lack of emphasis 
on proper coding may attribute to inaccuracies in PBSA coding in the J001.  Although 
this study does not measure these influences, it does test and analyze the extent of 
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possible validity concerns by evaluating a sample of PBSA coded contracts against the 
PBSA criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook.   
External validity is the extent to which a study’s results apply to situations beyond 
the study itself (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  Two areas of this study have external validity 
concerns.  First, the contracts evaluated from the three WPAFB contracting offices 
represent only a sample of PBSA coded contracts.  While this study does not contend that 
the sampled PBSA contracts from these three offices are a proper representation of all 
PBSA contracts in the USAF, the study does maintain that the contracts evaluated are a 
reasonable representation and sample of all the PBSA coded contracts in those respective 
offices.   Secondly, because only the services above $100,000 not excluded from PBSA 
use were analyzed in this study, results and conclusions drawn from this study do not 
apply to services less than or equal to $100,000 or services excluded from PBSA use.  
Although services falling in these categories are not required to be procured using PBSA 
techniques, these techniques are encouraged and sometimes used when it is deemed 
applicable.  How and if these actions differ from eligible actions is unknown.  However, 
because many of these actions are relatively insignificant in dollar amount compared to 
the entire sum of the actions, it is assumed they would have little to no effect on the 
cumulative calculations.    
 The reliability of a measurement instrument is the extent to which it yields 
consistent results when measuring characteristics that have not changed (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2001).  The proven analysis tools of logistic regression and contingency tables 
do not hinder the reliability of the study, but there are some reliability concerns with the 
data in the J001 database.  The two previously mentioned GAO reports alluded to these 
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reliability concerns within all government procurements databases.  While it is 
impossible to counter any subjective decisions incorrectly made by individuals inputting 
data into the database, it is possible to assess the reliability, which is done by sampling 
PBSA coded contracts.  However, because the sample only looks at PBSA, the reliability 
of other DD350 characteristics is not accounted for.   
 
Summary   
Chapter 3 discusses the research problem, investigative questions, data gathering, 
data reliability, data analysis, and validity and reliability.  Chapter 4 will address the 
results and analysis, findings based on the results and analysis, and any conclusions that 
can be drawn from the findings. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the research results and answers to each of the five 
investigative questions.  Referenced throughout the chapter are multiple appendices that 
provide more detailed breakouts of the research results.  Included in these appendices are 
spreadsheets that separate PBSA actions and dollars by Service Category, Type of 
Contract, and Type of Entity.  These appendices can be found at the end of this thesis.   
 
Data Analysis  
Investigative Question 1.  In order to answer investigative question 1, the 
following hypotheses were established:   
Null hypothesis #1 (Ho1):  p ≥ .10   
Alternate hypothesis #1 (Ha1): p < .10   
Although the goal was to evaluate only 30 PBSA contracts from each of the three offices, 
the researcher managed to evaluate a total of 102 contracts; 36 from AFRL Det 1/PK, 34 
from 88ABW/PK, and 32 from ASC/PK.  Of the 102 contracts evaluated, 3 were 
determined not to meet the minimum mandatory criteria identified in the PBSA 
Guidebook.  Therefore, the z test statistic was calculated using n = 102 and = 3/102, or 
0.029.  Substituting the values into the test statistic, a z value of -2.38 was obtained.   
p̂
  Test Statistic: z = 
ˆ
ˆ o
p
p p
σ
−  
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      = .029 .1
(.1)(.9)
102
−  
     = -2.38 
 Because the calculated z value is less than -2.33, which is the cut-off for the 
rejection region, the null hypothesis is rejected.  Therefore, there is sufficient evidence at 
the .01 level of significance to indicate that, for the three offices sampled, fewer than 
10% of the PBSA contracts were coded incorrectly.  Even though this test can only be 
generalized to the three offices the samples were drawn from, the results indicate that 
there may not be systematic problems in PBSA coding throughout the USAF.      
Investigative Question 2.  In order to answer investigative question 2, the 
following hypotheses were established: 
Null hypothesis #2 (Ho2):  The USAF is meeting interim PBSA goals. 
Alternate hypothesis #2 (Ha2):  The USAF is not meeting interim PBSA goals.  
 
Additionally, the following sub-hypotheses were established in order to assist in 
answering investigative question 2.  
Null hypothesis #2a (Ho2a):  FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 25 %. 
Alternate hypothesis #2a (Ha2a):  FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 25%. 
 
Null hypothesis #2b (Ho2b):  FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 35 %. 
Alternate hypothesis #2b (Ha2b):  FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 35%. 
 
Table 3 displays that in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 the USAF exceeded the interim goal of 
25% by awarding over 32% of its contracts using PBSA, a difference of over 7%.  
However, for FY 2004 the USAF awarded only 28.75% of its contracts using PBSA; 
when compared to the goal of 35%, the USAF was over 6% below the interim goal.   
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Table 3. The Percentage of Dollars PBSA Actual Compared to the Percentage of Dollars 
PBSA Goal for Fiscal Years (FY) 2003 and 2004. 
Percentage of Dollars PBSA FY03 FY04 
Actual 32.27 28.75 
Goal 25 35 
Difference 7.27 (6.25) 
 
The results conclude that the USAF did not meet the FY 2004 goal, and is not meeting 
interim PBSA goals.  Therefore, null hypothesis #2 is rejected. 
These numbers are better illustrated using Figure 1 below.  Included in this figure 
is the percentage of dollars PBSA from FY 2001 through FY 2004, as well as the 50% 
PBSA goal for FY 2005.  For the first three years there was a distinct upward trend in the 
percentage of actual dollars awarded using PBSA.  However, in FY 2004 the trend was 
broken and there was a noticeable drop in the actual PBSA percentage.   
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Figure 1.  The percentage of actual dollars PBSA and the goal for percentage of dollars 
PBSA as a function of Fiscal Year. 
 
Further analyzing the data using the summary tables included in Appendices C, D, 
E, and F, additional interesting phenomena were discovered.  For instance, Figure 2 
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shows that during FY 2004, not only did the percentage of PBSA dollars decline, but so 
did the cumulative PBSA dollars and cumulative total dollars.  Thus, PBSA awards 
included a smaller percentage of a smaller total dollars awarded.  Although it is uncertain 
what caused this phenomenon, it may be associated with the reason for a decrease in the 
PBSA percentage during FY 2004. 
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Figure 2.  PBSA dollars and total dollars as a function of Fiscal Year. 
 
 
Additionally, when analyzing the data by variable Type of Contract, it is 
interesting to note that contracts coded L (Fixed Price Incentive), M (Fixed Price Award 
Fee), R (Cost Plus Award Fee), Y (Time and Materials), and Z (Labor Hour) or left 
blank, all had a decrease in the percentage of dollars PBSA for FY 2004 (see Figure 3).  
The decrease in Cost Plus Award Fee contracts is the most significant because in FY 
2004, these types of contracts accounted for over 25% of the total eligible dollars.  All the 
other contracts that realized a decrease in the percentage of dollars PBSA for FY 2004 
each accounted for less than 9% of the total eligible dollars.   
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Figure 3.  Percentage of total dollars PBSA by Type of Contract. 
 
Surprisingly, contracts coded J (Firm Fixed Price) and U (Cost Plus Fixed Fee), 
which together account for over 45% of all eligible dollars during FY 2004, both 
managed to increase their percentage of dollars PBSA.  Unfortunately, these increases 
could not overcome the effect of the percentage decreases in the other contract types. 
Investigative Question 3.  In order to answer investigative question 3, the 
following hypotheses were established: 
Null hypothesis #3 (Ho3):  The USAF will meet the mandated FY 2005 goal of 
50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA. 
Alternate hypothesis #3 (Ha3):  The USAF will not meet the mandated FY 2005 
goal of 50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA. 
 
Null hypothesis #3a (Ho3a):  The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA ≥ 50%  
Alternate hypothesis #3a (Ha3a):  The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA < 50% 
 
Null hypothesis #3b (Ho3b):  The FY 2005 % of action PBSA ≥ 50% 
Alternate hypothesis #3b (Ha3b):  The FY 2005 % of actions PBSA < 50% 
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The JMP outputs in Figures 4 and 5 summarize the least squares fit of the linear 
regression models to the percentage dollars and actions PBSA. 
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Figure 4.  JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of dollars PBSA. 
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Figure 5.  JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of actions PBSA. 
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As expected, neither model was very predictive, as evident by the low F statistic 
values and high P-values.  The percentage drop for FY 2004 and the use of only four data 
points to build these models, both had a negative effect on the establishment of a good 
trend line.  However, despite the models limitations, they were still used to forecast for 
the percentage of dollars and actions PBSA for FY 2005.  
Using the calculated intercept and parameter coefficients, the following models 
were established: 
% Dollars PBSA = 25.6594 + 1.2922 * Year 
% Actions PBSA = 18.5172 + 4.0267 * Year 
 
By substituting 5 in for the variable Year, the following forecasted PBSA percentages 
were calculated: 
  % Dollars PBSA = 32.12  
  % Actions PBSA = 38.65 
 
Figures 6 and 7 provide a better illustration of the linear regression lines plotted with the 
actual PBSA percentages.  
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Figure 6. The percentage of dollars PBSA and the liner regression line for percentage of 
dollars PBSA as a function of Fiscal Year. 
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Figure 7. The percentage of actions PBSA and the liner regression line for percentage of 
actions PBSA as a function of Fiscal Year. 
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Obviously the PBSA percentages for both dollars and actions are well below the 
goal of 50%, thus resulting in the rejection of the null hypotheses for both PBSA dollars 
and actions. 
Assuming the FY 2004 percentages were anomalies, the FY 2004 data points 
were removed and new regression models were built.  The JMP outputs in Figures 8 and 
9 summarize the least squares fit of the linear regression models to the percentage dollars 
and actions PBSA, excluding FY 2004. 
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Figure 8.  JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of dollars PBSA, excluding FY 
2004. 
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Figure 9.  JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of actions PBSA, excluding FY 
2004. 
 
Removing the data point for FY 2004 significantly increased the reliability of the 
models, as evident by the higher F statistic values and lower P-values.  Using these 
models, the percentage of dollars and actions PBSA for FY 2005 were calculated.  
Using the calculated intercept and parameters coefficients, the following models 
were established: 
% Dollars PBSA = 22.2025 + 3.3664 * Year 
% Actions PBSA = 14.2983 + 6.5580 * Year 
 
By substituting 5 in for the variable Year, the following forecasted PBSA percentages 
were calculated: 
 % Dollars PBSA = 39.03  
 % Actions PBSA = 47.09 
 
Again, the PBSA percentages for both dollars and actions are below the goal of 50%, 
thus resulting in the rejection of the null hypotheses for both PBSA dollars and actions.  
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A 2-period moving average was also used to forecast for FY 2005 PBSA 
percentages.  Using this method, the following forecasted percentages for FY 2005 were 
calculated: 
% Dollars PBSA = 30.51 
% Actions PBSA = 32.91 
 
Assuming the FY 2004 percentages were anomalies, the FY 2004 data points 
were removed and new percentages were calculated for FY 2004 and 2005 using a 2-
period moving average.  Using this method the following forecasted percentages for FY 
2004 and 2005 were calculated: 
FY 2004 % Dollars PBSA = 30.64 
FY 2004 % Actions PBSA = 30.82 
 
FY 2005 % Dollars PBSA = 30.54 
FY 2005 % Actions PBSA = 32.39 
 
The removal of the FY 2004 percentages resulted in only a small change in the 
forecasted percentages for FY 2005.   Again, the PBSA percentages for both dollars and 
actions are below the goal of 50%, thus resulting in the rejection of the null hypotheses 
for both PBSA dollars and actions.  Table 4 summarizes all forecast results for FY 2005. 
Table 4. Summary of Forecast Results. 
% Actions PBSA% Dollars PBSA
Linear Regression 38.65 32.12
Linear Regression (w/out FY 2004) 47.09 39.03
Moving Average 32.91 30.51
Moving Average (w/out FY 2004) 32.39 30.54
FY 2005 ForecastForecasting Method
 
 
All forecasted PBSA percentages for FY 2005, measured in both dollars and actions, 
were below the goal of 50% and resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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Investigative Question 4.   In order to answer investigative question 4, the 
following hypotheses were established:  
Null hypothesis #4 (Ho4 dollars):  The percentage of modifications, measured in 
dollars, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in 
dollars, coded PBSA. 
Alternate hypothesis #4 (Ha4 dollars):  The percentage of modifications, measured in 
dollars, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications, 
measured in dollars, coded PBSA.   
 
Null hypothesis #4 (Ho4 actions):  The percentage of modifications, measured in 
actions, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in 
actions, coded PBSA. 
Alternate hypothesis #4 (Ha4 actions):  The percentage of modifications, measured 
in actions, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications, 
measured in actions, coded PBSA.  
 
Additionally, the following sub-hypotheses were established in order to assist in 
answering investigative question 4: 
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5% 
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%  
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5% 
 
A summary of the results broken out for each year in both dollars and actions is displayed 
in Tables 5 and 6 below. 
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Table 5. The Percentage of Modification Dollars PBSA Compared to the Percentage of 
Non-Modification Dollars PBSA for Fiscal Years (FY) 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
Percentage of PBSA Dollars FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 
Modifications 25.51 25.60 29.31 22.32 
Non-Modifications 25.56 32.77 34.57 35.08 
Difference (Absolute Value) 0.04 7.17 5.26 12.75 
 
Table 6. The Percentage of Modification Actions PBSA Compared to the Percentage of 
Non-Modification Actions PBSA for Fiscal Years (FY) 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
Percentage of PBSA Actions FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 
Modifications 21.55 27.96 33.61 32.45 
Non-Modifications 20.17 27.88 33.78 31.92 
Difference (Absolute Value) 1.39 0.08 0.17 0.54 
 
These calculations are better illustrated using line graphs.  Figure 10 shows that 
the percentage of modifications coded PBSA, measured in actions, was almost identical 
to the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA.  Figure 11 shows that the 
percentage of modifications coded PBSA, measured in dollars, was more than 5% less 
than the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA for FYs 2002, 2003, and 2004.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis in dollars is rejected, but the null hypothesis in actions 
cannot be rejected.   
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Figure 10. The percentage of modifications PBSA and percentage of non-modifications 
PBSA, measured in actions, as a function of Fiscal Year. 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04
Fiscal Year
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
% Modification Dollars PBSA
% Non-Modification Dollars PBSA
 
Figure 11. The percentage of modifications PBSA and percentage of non-modifications 
PBSA, measured in dollars, as a function of Fiscal Year. 
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Further analysis of the data revealed additional interesting phenomena.  Figure 12 
illustrates how the dollar amount per PBSA modification has decreased each year, while 
the dollar amount per non-PBSA modifications has increased the last three years. 
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Figure 12. The dollars per action for all PBSA modifications and non-PBSA 
modifications, as a function of Fiscal Year. 
 
Conversely, Figure 13 illustrates how the dollar amount per PBSA non-
modification, which are new PBSA contracts, has been greater than non-PBSA non-
modifications each year. 
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Figure 13. The dollars per action for all PBSA non-modifications and non-PBSA non-
modifications, as a function of Fiscal Year. 
 
Investigative Question 5.  The following hypotheses were established in order to 
answer investigative question 5: 
Null hypothesis #6 (Ho6):  Classification “x” and PBSA are independent   
Alternate hypothesis #6 (Ha6):  Classification “x” and PBSA are dependent 
 
Dependency was determined using contingency tables.  All classifications, except one, 
were found to be dependent, thus supporting the rejection of the null hypothesis.  Multi-
Year Contract was the only classification that yielded a chi-square (χ2) value that was 
smaller than chi-square alpha (χ2α), thus not falling in the rejection region.  Again, it is 
important to note that contingency tables were unable to determine dependency for some 
classifications because expected cell counts were less than 1.  These classifications 
included FSC or SVC Code, NAICS Code, and Authority for Other than Full and Open 
Competition.  Table 7 summarizes the results from the contingency table analysis.  
Printouts of all the contingency tables can be found in Appendix G.  
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Table 7. Summary of Contingency Tables 
Classification χ2 χ2α df Prob> 
χ2
Results 
B1C – Bundled Contract 124.58 6.64 1 <.0001 Dependent 
B1D – Bundled Contract Exception 230.56 11.34 3 <.0001 Dependent 
B10 – Multi-Year Contract 0.07 6.63 1 .7877 Independent 
B13A – Contract/Order 1790.86 18.48 7 0.0000 Dependent 
B13B – Type of Indefinite-Delivery 
Contract 122.42 11.34 3 <.0001 Dependent 
B13E – Multiple Award Contract Fair 
Opportunity 10017.72 15.09 5 0.0000 Dependent 
B13F – Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use 2112.51 13.28 4 0.0000 Dependent 
C1 - Synopsis 1479.44 11.34 3 <.0001 Dependent 
C2 – Reason Not Synopsized 603.47 13.28 4 <.0001 Dependent 
C3 – Extent Competed 796.09 13.28 4 <.0001 Dependent 
C5 – Type of Contract 4549.71 26.22 12 <.0001 Dependent 
C8 – Solicitation Procedures 3405.04 21.67 9 0.0000 Dependent 
C14 – Commercial Items 2816.34 9.21 2 0.0000 Dependent 
D1A – Type of Entity 2334.19 24.73 11 0.0000 Dependent 
D1B – Women-Owned Business 1089.73 11.34 3 <.0001 Dependent 
D1C – HUBZone Representation  563.87 9.21 2 <.0001 Dependent 
D1D – Ethnic Group 397.33 18.48 7 <.0001 Dependent 
D4A – Type of Set-Aside 1304.75 20.09 8 <.0001 Dependent 
D4B – Type of Preference 1066.71 11.34 3 <.0001 Dependent 
D7 – SBIR Program 1275.33 13.28 4 <.0001 Dependent 
 
 
 For single response variables, such as Bundled Contract, a result of “Dependent” 
means that there is dependence between the variable being coded “Yes” or “No” and 
PBSA being coded “Yes” or “No.”  For multi-response variables, such as Contract/Order, 
a result of “Dependent” means that there is dependence between the variable’s possible 
responses and PBSA being coded “Yes” or “No.”  However, contingency tables only 
determine dependency between two classifications, not the extent of the relationship.  
Because of this, contingency tables were used to help narrow down the classifications 
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used for logistic regression.  Unfortunately, only one classification, Multi-Year Contract, 
was independent, thus excluded from further analysis.     
Logistic regression was also used to answer investigative question 5.  The 
following hypotheses were established: 
Null hypothesis #5 (Ho5):  The parameter for variable “x” equals zero.  
Alternate hypothesis #5 (Ha5):  The parameter for variable “x” does not equal 
zero. 
 
As depicted in Table 8, logistic regression yielded the same χ2 values calculated 
using contingency tables.  This was expected because the logistic regression models were 
built using only one independent variable and a dependent variable, PBSA.  This is 
similar to contingency tables, which test the dependency between only two variables.  
Based on the χ2 and associated P-values, the null hypotheses for all variables, except 
Obligated or Deobligated Dollars, are rejected.  The null hypothesis for Obligated or 
Deobligated Dollars is not rejected, because the P-value of .9928 is clearly larger than the 
significance level of .01.   
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Table 8. Summary of Logistic Regression 
Variable χ2 Prob> χ2 R2 (U) 
B1C – Bundled Contract 124.58 <.0001 0.0013 
B8 - Obligated or Deobligated Dollars .000081 0.9928 0.0000 
B13A – Contract/Order 1790.86 0.0000 0.0193 
B13B – Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract 122.42 <.0001 0.0013 
B13E – Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity 10017.72 0.0000 0.1081 
B13F – Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use 212.51 0.0000 0.0228 
C1 - Synopsis 1479.44 <.0001 0.0160 
C3 – Extent Competed 796.09 <.0001 0.0086 
C5 – Type of Contract 4549.71 0.0000 0.0491 
C14 – Commercial Items 28.16 0.0000 0.0304 
D1B – Women-Owned Business 1089.73 <.0001 0.0118 
D1C – HUBZone Representation  563.87 <.0001 0.0061 
D1D – Ethnic Group 397.33 <.0001 0.0043 
D4A – Type of Set-Aside 1304.75 <.0001 0.0141 
D4B – Type of Preference 1066.71 <.0001 0.0115 
D7 – SBIR Program 1275.33 <.0001 0.0138 
  
In addition to χ2 and associated P-values, logistic regression also calculated R2 
(U) values for each variable.  As shown in Table 8, the highest R2 (U) value obtained was 
.1081 for Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity, which also yielded the highest χ2 
value using contingency tables.  The lowest R2 (U) value obtained was .0000 for 
Obligated or Deobligated Dollars.  This means that the single variable model with the 
most explanatory power is the model that includes the variable Multiple Award Contract 
Fair Opportunity and the single variable model with the least explanatory power is the 
model that includes the variable Obligated or Deobligated Dollars.  It is important to note 
that some of the variable responses were classified as unstable, meaning that a regression 
model could not be established.  Variables that had unstable responses included Bundled 
Contract Exception, FSC or SVC Code, NAICS Code, Reason Not Synopsized, 
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Solicitation Procedures, Authority for Other than Full and Open Competition, and Type 
of Entity.   
In an attempt to build a model for prediction of PBSA, the 15 variables classified 
as stable in logistic regression were cumulatively tested against the independent variable 
PBSA.  When using all 15 stable variables, an R2 (U) of .2019 was obtained. 
Unfortunately, many of the parameter estimates for the variable responses in the model 
were identified as being biased.  This indicates that there are one or more linear 
dependencies in the design and the linear combination of these factors exactly duplicates 
another factor's value (JMP, 2003).  These variables included Type of Set-Aside, Type of 
Preference, Women-Owned Business, Type of Contract, Extent Competed, Synopsis, and 
Contract/Order.  Consequently all of these variables were removed from the model.  With 
both the unstable and biased variables removed from the model an R2 (U) of .1615 was 
obtained. Table 9 summarizes these results.   
Table 9. Summary of Logistic Regression Model 
Variable χ2 Prob> χ2 R2 (U) 
Model w/out Unstable or Biased Variables 15425.8 0.0000 0.1615 
 
This model includes a total of 7 independent variables.  The parameter estimates for the 
variable responses included in this model can be found in Appendix H.  The Wald 
statistic χ2 value was used to test the significance of the model.  The χ2 value and 
associated P-value support the rejection of the null hypothesis that the parameter 
estimates are equal to zero.     
Separate regressions were also run for each independent variable against the 
dependent variable, PBSA.  Parameter estimates for each variable response were 
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calculated using logistic regression and tested using the null and alternate hypotheses.  
The probability of PBSA for each response was calculated by substituting the parameter 
estimate and intercept values into the logistic regression formula.  These results are 
displayed in Tables 10 through 25.   
Table 10. Summary of Bundled Contract Response Parameter Estimates and Probability 
of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.1058595 0.0729567 2.11 0.1468  
Bundled Contract [N] -0.784822 0.0729567 115.72 <.0001 0.2909 
 
Table 11. Summary of Obligated or Deobligated Dollars Parameter Estimates and 
Probability of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.8857118 0.0080113 12223 0.0000  
Obligated or 
Deobligated Dollars -7.626e-12 8.454e-10 0.00 0.9928 
2.92E-
01 
 
Table 12. Summary of Contract/Order Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of 
PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.998353 0.0358911 773.74 <.0001  
Contract/Order [1] -0.7217959 0.1237749 34.01 <.0001 0.1518 
Contract/Order [3] -0.2074712 0.0380209 29.78 <.0001 0.2304 
Contract/Order [4] -0.9436227 0.0952635 98.12 <.0001 0.1254 
Contract/Order [5] 0.18104332 0.0371747 23.72 <.0001 0.3063 
Contract/Order [6] 0.79224635 0.0405313 382.07 <.0001 0.4486 
Contract/Order [7] -0.0414182 0.1740474 0.06 0.8119 0.2611 
Contract/Order [8] 1.10775159 0.0975163 129.04 <.0001 0.5273 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83
 
Table 13. Summary of Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract Response Parameter 
Estimates and Probability of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -1.0211204 0.0219221 2169.6 0.0000  
Type of Indefinite-
Delivery Contract [A] 0.07728689 0.0275839 7.85 0.0051 0.2801 
Type of Indefinite-
Delivery Contract [B] 0.22509695 0.023591 91.04 <.0001 0.3108 
Type of Indefinite-
Delivery Contract [C] -0.3855376 0.0624557 38.11 <.0001 0.1967 
 
Table 14. Summary of Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity Response Parameter 
Estimates and Probability of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.090934 0.0655989 1.92 0.1657  
Multiple Award Contract 
Fair Opportunity [A] -1.474946 0.0720001 419.65 <.0001 0.1728 
Multiple Award Contract 
Fair Opportunity [B] -0.3685983 0.3081339 1.43 <.0001 0.3870 
Multiple Award Contract 
Fair Opportunity [C] -0.7424187 0.0658268 60.02 <.0001 0.3029 
Multiple Award Contract 
Fair Opportunity [D] 0.33541685 0.0849517 15.59 <.0001 0.5608 
Multiple Award Contract 
Fair Opportunity [E] 3.23880086 0.0906054 1277.8 <.0001 0.9588 
 
Table 15. Summary of Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use Response Parameter Estimates 
and Probability of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.6769128 0.0327053 428.38 <.0001  
Indefinite-Delivery 
Contract Use [A] 0.13168575 0.0836275 2.48 0.1153 0.3669 
Indefinite-Delivery 
Contract Use [B] -0.4508388 0.0864576 27.19 <.0001 0.2445 
Indefinite-Delivery 
Contract Use [C] 0.06102411 0.0671189 0.83 0.3632 0.3507 
Indefinite-Delivery 
Contract Use [D] 0.62824516 0.036076 303.26 <.0001 0.4878 
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Table 16. Summary of Synopsis Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.8755429 0.0112263 6080.5 0.0000  
Synopsis [A] 0.0127636 0.0133898 0.91 0.3405 0.2967 
Synopsis [B] -0.2978881 0.0262107 129.17 <.0001 0.2362 
Synopsis [N] -0.3812092 0.0168928 509.24 <.0001 0.2215 
 
Table 17. Summary of Extent Competed Response Parameter Estimates and Probability 
of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -1.1004947 0.0540626 414.36 <.0001  
Extent Competed [A] 0.31589528 0.0544904 33.61 <.0001 0.3133 
Extent Competed [B] 0.07087583 0.0582072 1.48 0.2234 0.2631 
Extent Competed [C] -0.4739783 0.0757671 39.13 <.0001 0.1715 
Extent Competed [D] -0.3875817 0.0582598 44.26 <.0001 0.1842 
 
Table 18. Summary of Type of Contract Response Parameter Estimates and Probability 
of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -1.0594573 0.0427791 613.34 <.0001  
Type of Contract [A] -0.8376623 0.4049809 4.28 0.0386 0.1304 
Type of Contract [J] 0.3953269 0.0440563 80.52 <.0001 0.3398 
Type of Contract [K] 0.83916138 0.0951713 77.75 <.0001 0.4451 
Type of Contract [L] -0.0684458 0.0946795 0.52 0.4697 0.2445 
Type of Contract [M] 0.91469634 0.0821388 124.01 <.0001 0.4638 
Type of Contract [R] 0.33138718 0.0501084 43.74 <.0001 0.3256 
Type of Contract [S] -0.8601807 0.0717832 143.59 <.0001 0.1279 
Type of Contract [T] -1.3640221 0.2600419 27.51 <.0001 0.0813 
Type of Contract [U] -0.922947 0.0485074 362.02 <.0001 0.1210 
Type of Contract [V] 0.4370051 0.0771864 32.05 <.0001 0.3492 
Type of Contract [Y] -0.1065667 0.0497674 4.59 <.0001 0.2375 
Type of Contract [Z] 0.39199958 0.0804276 23.76 <.0001 0.3390 
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Table 19. Summary of Commercial Items Response Parameter Estimates and Probability 
of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.4863992 0.0107112 2062.1 0.0000  
Commercial Items [N] -0.6438603 0.0120437 2858 0.0000 0.2441 
Commercial Items [Y] 0.39160175 0.016669 551.91 <.0001 0.4763 
 
Table 20. Summary of Women-Owned Business Response Parameter Estimates and 
Probability of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.714826 0.0198109 1301.9 <.0001  
Women-Owned 
Business [N] -0.2731451 0.0207879 172.65 <.0001 0.2713 
Women-Owned 
Business [U] 0.05253677 0.0498592 1.11 0.2920 0.3402 
Women-Owned 
Business [Y] -0.2850085 0.034124 69.76 <.0001 0.2689 
 
Table 21. Summary of HUBZone Representation Response Parameter Estimates and 
Probability of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>
χ2
Prob 
PBSA 
Intercept -1.111624 0.0182761 3699.6 0.0000  
HUBZone Representation [N] -0.029883 0.0203999 2.15 0.1430 0.2420 
HUBZone Representation [Y] -0.317349 0.0349925 82.25 <.0001 0.1932 
 
Table 22. Summary of Ethnic Group Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of 
PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -1.1986828 0.0246557 2363.6 0.0000  
Ethnic Group [A] -0.0632047 0.0971424 0.42 0.5153 0.2206 
Ethnic Group [B] 0.31302413 0.0597238 27.47 <.0001 0.2920 
Ethnic Group [C] 0.21764375 0.0483839 20.23 <.0001 0.2726 
Ethnic Group [D] -0.2523166 0.0520292 23.52 <.0001 0.1898 
Ethnic Group [E] -0.1670177 0.045031 13.76 0.0002 0.2033 
Ethnic Group [F] -0.3618537 0.0961776 14.16 0.0002 0.1735 
Ethnic Group [Z] -0.0550928 0.0636474 0.75 0.3867 0.2220 
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Table 23. Summary of Type of Set-Aside Response Parameter Estimates and Probability 
of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -1.1581767 0.050894 517.87 <.0001  
Type of Set-Aside [A] 0.19917358 0.0516292 14.88 0.0001 0.2770 
Type of Set-Aside [B] 0.36304191 0.0553928 42.95 <.0001 0.3110 
Type of Set-Aside [C] -0.210333 0.1277981 2.71 0.0998 0.2028 
Type of Set-Aside [D] -0.1492011 0.0564274 6.99 0.0082 0.2129 
Type of Set-Aside [E] -0.1824305 0.1418217 1.65 0.1983 0.2074 
Type of Set-Aside [F] -0.6467775 0.2793333 5.36 0.0206 0.1412 
Type of Set-Aside [K] -0.0391031 0.1176526 0.11 0.7396 0.2319 
Type of Set-Aside [L] -0.2833379 0.2151878 1.73 0.1879 0.1913 
 
Table 24. Summary of Type of Preference Response Parameter Estimates and Probability 
of PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ
2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -0.9750136 0.3291877 8.77 0.0031  
Type of Preference [A] -0.0079431 0.329244 0.00 0.9808 0.2723 
Type of Preference [B] -0.1235974 0.8803583 0.02 0.8883 0.2500 
Type of Preference [D] -0.634264 0.5552866 1.30 0.2534 0.1666 
 
Table 25. Summary of SBIR Program Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of 
PBSA 
Response Estimate Standard Error χ2 Prob>χ2 Prob PBSA 
Intercept -1.3166613 0.0930408 200.26 <.0001  
SBIR Program [A] 0.35851964 0.0932893 14.77 0.0001 0.2772 
SBIR Program [B] -0.4535634 0.3104716 2.13 0.1440 0.1455 
SBIR Program [C] -0.3433492 0.1012258 11.51 0.0007 0.1597 
SBIR Program [D] -0.6444348 0.2210532 8.50 0.0036 0.1233 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected for all responses with P-values < .01.  This means 
that the selection of these particular responses do not change the probability of an action 
being PBSA.  For all other responses, where the null hypothesis was rejected, a positive 
parameter estimate value signifies an increase in the probability of an action being PBSA 
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when that particular response is chosen.  A negative value signifies a decrease in the 
probability of an action being PBSA.  A majority of the parameter estimates were 
negative.  When a response parameter estimate added with its corresponding intercept 
parameter estimate, resulted in a positive value, the probability of that action being PBSA 
was greater than .5.  Conversely, when a response parameter estimate added with its 
corresponding intercept parameter estimate, resulted in a negative value, the probability 
of that action being PBSA was less than .5.   
By far, the most positively influential response variable is Multiple Award 
Contract Fair Opportunity response “E” with a parameter estimate of 3.2388 and a 
probability of PBSA of .9588.  This means when response “E” is selected, the probability 
of that action being PBSA is almost 96%.  Response “E” is Minimum Guarantee and is 
coded when it was necessary to place an order to satisfy a minimum amount guaranteed 
to the contractor.  The next most positively influential response variable is 
Contract/Order response “8” with a parameter estimate of 1.1078 and probability of 
PBSA of .5273.  This means when response “8” is selected, the probability of that action 
being PBSA is over 52%.  Response “8” is Order from Procurement List and is entered 
when the contracting action is an action placed with Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) 
or a JWOD Participating Nonprofit Agency.   
The most negatively influential response variable is Type of Contract response 
“T,” with parameter estimate of -1.36402 and a probability of PBSA of .0813.  This 
means when response “T” is selected, the probability of that action being PBSA is 8.13%. 
Response “T” is the designation for a Cost-Sharing contract    The next most negatively 
influential response variable is Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity response “A” 
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with a parameter estimate of -1.4749 and a probability of PBSA of .17228.  This means 
when response “A” is selected, the probability of that action being PBSA is 17.23%.  
Response “A” is Fair Opportunity Process and is entered when the delivery or task order 
was issued pursuant to a process that permitted each contract awardee a fair opportunity 
to be considered. 
 
 
Summary 
 
 This chapter presented and discussed the research results.  A sample of PBSA 
contracts taken from three contracting offices were found to be consistent with the 
minimum criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook, suggesting that there may not be a 
systematic problem with PBSA coding.  Using descriptive statistics, it was concluded that 
the USAF is not meeting interim PBSA goals and the percentage of modification dollars 
coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modification dollars coded PBSA.  
Additionally, forecasting suggested that the USAF will not meet the FY 2005 goal of 
50% of all actions and dollars PBSA.  Lastly, contingency tables and logistic regression 
identified dependent variables and variable responses that increase and decrease the 
probability of an action being PBSA.   Chapter 5 will discuss the conclusions and 
recommendations stemming from these results, address the limitations of the study, and 
make suggestions for future research. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study was to evaluate and analyze the current and expected 
future states of Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) implementation in the 
United States Air Force (USAF) in order to assist USAF leadership in making PBSA 
implementation decisions.  This chapter outlines the conclusions drawn from the results 
of this study and offers recommendations for PBSA implementation improvements.  Also 
included in this chapter are the limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
A total of five investigative questions were established in order to answer and 
address the over arching research question of, “What are the current and expected future 
states of PBSA implementation in the USAF?”  
Conclusions - Investigative Question 1.  Is the J001 database, which is the source 
of government procurement data, reliable?  The answer to this question is still unknown.  
However, this research concludes that the coding of PBSA contracts for the 88 ABW/PK, 
AFRL Det 1/PK, and ASC/PK is reliable and consistent with the minimum mandatory 
criteria identified in The Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisitions in the 
Department of Defense (PBSA Guidebook).  While this determination of reliability 
cannot be generalized statistically to the entire J001 database, it does indicate that there 
may not be systematic problems with PBSA coding.  For PBSA coding, these results are 
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contrary to past GAO findings that suggest federal procurement data is unreliable 
(Woods, 2003).  Additionally, the results imply that the J001 database may not be as 
inaccurate as initially reported.    
Recommendations – Investigative Question 1.  Because the results suggest that 
there may not be a systematic problem with PBSA coding in the J001 database, it is 
recommended that the USAF increase utilization of the J001 database for PBSA 
performance tracking.  Many organizations rely on self-reports from other agencies when 
compiling PBSA metrics.  From the researcher’s personal experience, these self-reports, 
many times, differ from what was actually coded on the DD Form 350.  In addition, this 
self-reports take time and money to generate.  Utilizing the J001 database may ultimately 
be the most accurate and efficient means of measuring PBSA performance and should be 
used to the maximum extent practicable.     
Conclusions - Investigative Question 2.  Is the USAF meeting interim PBSA 
goals?  The answer to this question is no.  The USAF was on track and had met all 
interim PBSA goals established by the acting Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne, through FY 2003.  This was 
large in part due to the fact that goals were set low and were easily attainable.  However, 
in FY 2004 the percentage of dollars awarded using PBSA significantly dropped and was 
well below the FY 2004 goal of 35 percent.   
The decrease in PBSA percentages implies several possible alternatives.  First, the 
decrease implies that the emphasis on PBSA in waning.  Now in its fourth year, PBSA 
implementation may not be as much of as hot topic as it was upon initial start-up.   
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Conversely, the decrease in PBSA percentages may imply that there has been an 
increase in education, training, and awareness of PBSA techniques and application and 
contracting personnel are better at determining which contracts should use PBSA.  Of the 
3 incorrectly coded PBSA contracts sampled in this study, 2 of them were awarded 
during the first 2 years of PBSA implementation.  This suggests that PBSA coding may 
be becoming more accurate as years progress.  As PBSA coding becomes more accurate, 
fewer incorrectly coded contracts may be contributing to PBSA percentages.  The 
decrease in PBSA percentages during FY 2004 may not be as significant due to the fact 
that the percentages during the previous years may have been over inflated with 
incorrectly coded PBSA contracts.   
Lastly, the decrease in PBSA percentages may imply that the USAF has hit a 
natural plateau in PBSA.  The literature shows no rationale for establishment of the 
interim PBSA goals, other than progression towards the FY 2005 goal of 50%.  The 
commercial sector emphasizes PBSA very little due to the small percentage of dollars 
attributed to the procurement of services (Barry, 2003).  Maybe it is impractical to expect 
PBSA percentages greater than 35%.  The results show that achieving 20% to 30% PBSA 
for both actions and dollars is possible.  However, at what point are services that may not 
be suitable for PBSA being forced into PBSA methods for the sake of meeting mandated 
goals?  Because of this, the question that surfaces is, “Were these goals reasonable and 
attainable to begin with?”  This research suggests that they weren’t. 
Recommendations – Investigative Question 2.  It is recommended that the USAF 
leadership reinvigorate the emphasis on the use of PBSA.  This can be done by simply 
increasing PBSA communication up and down the chain of command.  While there are 
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endless methods to communicate the emphasis, leadership could significantly increase 
organizational awareness of PBSA by continually posting current PBSA percentages and 
PBSA percentage goals for each organization or agency.   
It is also recommended that USAF leadership revaluate PBSA goals.  Instead of 
establishing blanket percentage goals for all services actions, percentages should be 
established only for contract characteristics representing a large percentage of the total 
dollars or actions and a high probability of being PBSA.  For instance, it may not be as 
important to reach a goal of 50% of all PBSA dollars for Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
contracts when these type of contracts accounted for less than 2% of the total dollars for 
FY 2004 and are seldom used with PBSA.  However, it may be important to focus on the 
percentage of PBSA dollars for Firm Fixed Price contracts since they accounted for the 
largest percentage of total dollars for FY 2004, at over 36%, and, when compared to other 
responses, have a relatively high probability of PBSA at 33%.  This will lead to focused 
PBSA efforts directed at areas that make the most sense for PBSA use and are the most 
fiscally influential.  While this may not lead to the achievement of 50% of all actions and 
dollars PBSA, it can lead to the maximizing of PBSA efforts in the areas that represent 
the largest percentage of total dollars. 
Conclusions - Investigative Question 3.  Is the USAF on track to meet future 
mandated PBSA goals?  The answer to this question is no.  Even though there were only 
four data points, several forecasting methods were used.  Using liner regression and 
moving averages, forecasts of the percentage actions and dollars PBSA for FY 2005 were 
calculated.  All forecasts indicate that the USAF will fall well short of the 50% PBSA 
goal for FY 2005.  Although the forecasting models used were questionable, the 
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graphical evidence illustrates a trend line falling well short of 50% for FY 2005.  There 
was clearly an upward trend in the percentages of PBSA prior to FY 2004, possibly 
meaning that the decrease in FY 2004 was an anomaly and an upward trend may resume 
for FY 2005.  However, in order to make a truly reliable forecast more data points would 
need to be included in the models. 
These results support Lacey’s (2004) suspicion that the USAF will not meet the 
FY 2005 goal of 50% PBSA.  Similarly to the conclusions for investigative question 2, 
the results imply that the goal may not have been reasonable or attainable to begin with 
and that the USAF may have hit a natural plateau in PBSA.   
Recommendations - Investigative Question 3.  Similar to investigative question 1, 
it is recommended that USAF leadership reinvigorate the emphasis on PBSA use and 
revaluate PBSA goals.   
Conclusions - Investigative Question 4.  Is the percentage of modifications coded 
PBSA equal to the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA?  The answer to this 
question is no.  While the number of actions is relatively equal, the percentage of dollars 
PBSA for modifications is significantly smaller than the percentage of dollars PBSA for 
non-modifications.  Additionally, the cost per PBSA modification has decreased each 
year and been less than the cost per non-PBSA modifications every year.  Conversely, the 
cost per PBSA non-modification has been greater than the cost per non-PBSA non-
modification.  These results imply that new PBSA contracts, on average, cost more than 
non-PBSA contracts, but result in modifications that, on average, cost less than non-
PBSA modifications.   
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Recommendations - Investigative Question 4.  It is recommended that, when 
deciding whether to award a contract using PBSA techniques, contracting personnel take 
into consideration that future modifications to PBSA contracts may cost less than non-
PBSA contracts.  With less money being spent on modifications to PBSA contracts, a 
large percentage of future funds can be used to fund the procurement of new services or 
supplies.    
Conclusions - Investigative Question 5.  Are any particular acquisition 
characteristics associated with PBSA use?  The answer to this question is yes.  
Contingency tables clearly indicated that there are numerous contract characteristics that 
are dependent with PBSA, confirming Lacey’s (2004) ascertains.  However, contingency 
tables are unable to determine the extent of the dependencies.   
 Logistic Regression was able to identify which variable responses are significant 
and whether they increase or decrease the probability of an action being PBSA.  
Numerous variables were found to be significant, but very few of the variable responses 
increased the probability of an action being PBSA above 50 percent. 
 These results imply that PBSA is a complex type of contract that can be used in 
various types of contracting circumstances.  Predicting when to use PBSA can not easily 
be done by knowing one, two, or even “x” corresponding variables.  The use of PBSA 
should not be eliminated as a possibility simply because a certain variable response is 
selected.  While some responses may increase, such as Multiple Award Contract Fair 
Opportunity response “E,” or decrease the probability of PBSA, such as Type of Contract 
response “T,” none guarantee or completely eliminate the possibility of PBSA use.   
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Recommendations - Investigative Question 5.  It is recommended that contracting 
personnel look at all variables surrounding an acquisition when determining whether to 
use PBSA techniques.  The use of PBSA should not be dependent on the selection of a 
single variable response.  The results of this study show that there are numerous 
dependencies and correlations between contract characteristics and PBSA.  PBSA 
determination based on a single response should be avoided.    
 
Study Limitations 
Just like any research, there are some limitations to this study.  Factors that 
contributed to these shortcomings included funding limitations, time constraints, and 
practicality. 
The first limitation to this research is the reliability of the J001 database.  
Although a sample of PBSA contracts was taken and evaluated against the minimum 
mandatory PBSA criteria, it did not represent PBSA contracts throughout the USAF, only 
the three offices from which it was taken.  Therefore, the reliability of the J001 database 
across the USAF is still unknown.  An effort was made to select different types of 
contracting offices, which work with different types of services contracts.  However, the 
sample was unable to account for every demographic in USAF contracting. Additionally, 
while the results yielded from this sample were satisfactory, the results from a sample 
taken from the entire USAF may significantly differ, thus yielding a contradictory 
determination of the reliability of the J001 database. 
 The second limitation of this study is the fact that when evaluating the sampled 
contracts against the minimum mandatory PBSA criteria, the quality of the PBSA service 
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contracts was not taken into account.  For instance, a PBSA service contract that 
contained well thought-out, specific, and easily measured performance evaluation 
measurements was considered the same as a contract that met the bare minimum 
requirements for PBSA classification.  Because of this, it is not known if better quality 
PBSA contracts differ from minimum quality PBSA contracts, and thus yield different 
results.     
Another limitation of the study is the use of forecasting methods to forecast FY 
2005 percentages.  Because there was only four years of data to build a predictive model, 
the linear regression and 2-period moving average models established and used to 
forecast were not optimal.  Significance of the models was limited, but they did provide 
an illustration of the general trend of the data.       
 
Future Research 
 With so little research conducted in this field and still so many questions to be 
answered, the prospects for future research are plentiful.  Some of these research ideas 
stem from questions that surfaced from the results of this study, while some are simply 
questions that have yet to be answered.   
The first opportunity for future research is to confirm this study’s results that the 
J001 database is truly reliable, not only for the PBSA contracts at the three contracting 
offices sampled at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, but for all contracts across the entire 
USAF.  This could be done by taking a sample of PBSA coded contracts from the entire 
pool of PBSA contracts and evaluating them against the minimum mandatory PBSA 
criteria, similarly to the way in which investigative question 1 in this study was answered.  
 97
 
Careful stratification of the sample would need to be taken in order to ensure all USAF 
demographics were properly represented.  Not until this type of sample is evaluated and 
tested, will USAF leadership truly know the reliability of PBSA coding in the J001 
database.       
The next opportunity for future research would be to further the logistic 
regression analysis performed in this study by building a comprehensive model for 
prediction of PBSA using contracts variable responses.  It was apparent during this study 
that there are numerous variables that are dependent with PBSA.  Using this study’s 
results as a foundation, the research could solidify which variable responses, if any, when 
combined, significantly increase the probability of a contracting action being PBSA.  
This could be done by using other functional forms or combinations of variables.  The 
establishment of a predictive model may lead to underlying relationships with PBSA that 
are transparent on the surface.  However, any model would have to be evaluated for 
practical significance in order to provide any benefit to contracting personnel.  
 The next possible research effort would be to evaluate what is causing the 
fluctuation in PBSA percentages for different contract types from year to year.  The 
results from this study clearly show significant changes in PBSA percentages for 
particular contract variables, such as Type of Contract, from year to year.  Why these 
changes are occurring and what is causing them is unknown.  Some of these fluctuations 
may be insignificant because of the small percentage of the total dollars or actions the 
response may represent, and not be worth investigation.   Investigating the fluctuation of 
variable responses that account for a large percentage of the total dollars may reveal the 
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true cause of the decline in PBSA percentages in FY 2004 and lead to the true driver of 
PBSA use.    
The next opportunity for future research would be to study the relationship 
between service codes and PBSA use.  By identifying which individual service codes 
increase and decrease the probability of PBSA and account for the largest percentage of 
total dollars and/or actions, USAF leadership could gain a better understanding of what 
services do and do not facilitate the use of PBSA techniques.  Using this information, 
focused PBSA goals for individual service codes could be established. 
Another possible area of study would be the evaluation of cost savings associated 
with use of PBSA.  Of course, studies (OFPP, 1998) have concluded there are benefits 
are associated with PBSA use.  However, no recent studies have shown how much the 
USAF is saving, if any, by implementing and using PBSA.  If the USAF is not saving any 
money or gaining any quality by implementing and using PBSA, why spend the time and 
resources on PBSA training and the achievement of PBSA goals?  Additionally, if the 
USAF is achieving cost savings from PBSA, how does quality of the PBSA contracts 
affect the savings?  This study did not account for quality differences between PBSA 
contracts, as all PBSA contracts were deemed to be equal.  It would be interesting to 
know if better quality PBSA contracts yield more savings and/or better results than PBSA 
contracts that only meet the minimum PBSA criteria.    
 
Conclusion 
 The USAF has made tremendous strides in the implementation of PBSA.  
However, it is still falling short of interim goals and will most likely fall short of the 
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mandated FY 2005 goal.  However, the question of whether these goals were reasonable 
or attainable still remains unanswered.  Since the USAF has no equal in the commercial 
sector for comparison, it is impossible to know if such goals are reachable or if  the 
USAF has hit a natural plateau in PBSA use never experienced by any other organization.  
Instead of trying to convert everything to PBSA, USAF leadership should focus on 
maximizing PBSA in areas that are practical and fiscally influential to the overall 
percentage of total dollars, such as Firm Fixed Price type contracts.  While this may 
result in an overall percentage of PBSA less than 50%, it will lead to more efficient use 
of personnel and resources.  
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Appendix A:  Service Code Categories  
 
B.  Special Studies & Analysis – Not R&D 
C.  Architect & Engineering Services 
D.  Automatic Data Processing & Telecommunication Services 
E.  Purchase of Structures or Facilities   
F.  Natural Resources & Conservation Services 
G.  Social Services 
H.  Quality Control, Testing & Inspection Services 
J.  Maintenance, Repair & Rebuilding of Equipment  
K.  Modification of Equipment 
L.  Technical Representative Services 
M.  Operation of Government-Owned Facilities 
N.  Installation of Equipment 
P.  Salvage Services 
Q.  Medical Services 
R.  Professional, Administrative & Management Support Services 
S.  Utilities & Housekeeping Services 
T.  Photographic, Mapping, Printing & Publication Services 
U.  Educational & Training Services 
V.  Transportation, Travel & Relocation Services 
W.  Lease or Rental of Equipment 
X.  Lease or Rental of Facilities 
Y.  Construction of Structures & Facilities 
Z.  Maintenance, Repair or Alteration of Real Property 
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Appendix B:  Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA by Fiscal Year 
 
Total PBSA % PBSA
Dollars $19,733,040,849 $5,038,331,141 25.53%
Actions 15714 3239 20.61%
Total PBSA % PBSA
Dollars $22,310,837,208 $6,471,973,020 29.01%
Actions 18500 5162 27.90%
Total PBSA % PBSA
Dollars $28,511,634,144 $9,199,368,959 32.27%
Actions 21943 7401 33.73%
Total PBSA % PBSA
Dollars $26,649,991,736 $7,663,018,554 28.75%
Actions 20581 6605 32.09%
FY 2004
FY 2003
FY 2002
FY 2001
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Appendix C:  Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service 
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2001 
 
B12A - Service Category Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars of Total
A $8,949,600,040 4053 $1,472,290,609 236 16.45% 5.82% 45.35%
B $323,351,090 355 $39,381,294 50 12.18% 14.08% 1.64%
D $810,075,362 1008 $251,945,817 343 31.10% 34.03% 4.11%
E $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
F $43,189,084 81 $7,234,215 26 16.75% 32.10% 0.22%
G $22,675,781 22 $127,072 1 0.56% 4.55% 0.11%
H $45,715,319 27 $1,540,286 5 3.37% 18.52% 0.23%
I $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
J $1,599,715,391 1734 $227,989,005 269 14.25% 15.51% 8.11%
K $861,485,895 584 $67,917,913 22 7.88% 3.77% 4.37%
L $655,351,291 258 $607,736,150 171 92.73% 66.28% 3.32%
M $595,101,263 311 $322,396,915 170 54.18% 54.66% 3.02%
N $25,612,730 64 $7,022,123 20 27.42% 31.25% 0.13%
O $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
P $21,974,678 47 $3,381,878 8 15.39% 17.02% 0.11%
Q $14,457,567 31 $2,426,559 9 16.78% 29.03% 0.07%
R $2,883,200,951 2851 $933,254,934 928 32.37% 32.55% 14.61%
S $628,812,172 819 $312,262,807 414 49.66% 50.55% 3.19%
T $50,781,733 81 $9,435,215 19 18.58% 23.46% 0.26%
U $169,087,643 278 $45,850,191 54 27.12% 19.42% 0.86%
V $809,544,498 705 $708,031,511 467 87.46% 66.24% 4.10%
W $72,957,987 61 $15,664,421 19 21.47% 31.15% 0.37%
X $10,870,353 20 $2,442,226 8 22.47% 40.00% 0.06%
Z $1,139,480,021 2324 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 5.77%
Total $19,733,040,849 15714 $5,038,331,141 3239 25.53% 20.61% 100.00%
C5 - Type of Contract Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $911,955,691 1539 $341,675,527 578 37.47% 37.56% 4.62%
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm $132,953,058 23 $1,099,964 2 0.83% 8.70% 0.67%
J - Firm Fixed Price $7,121,978,511 7027 $2,342,189,011 1704 32.89% 24.25% 36.09%
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj $221,571,764 133 $45,583,739 52 20.57% 39.10% 1.12%
L - Fixed Price Incentive $545,378,522 137 $71,840,788 18 13.17% 13.14% 2.76%
M - Fixed Price Award Fee $168,635,400 127 $83,696,954 43 49.63% 33.86% 0.85%
R - Cost Plus Award Fee $6,382,828,278 1162 $1,775,037,365 278 27.81% 23.92% 32.35%
S - Cost Contract $613,186,136 400 $3,015,009 11 0.49% 2.75% 3.11%
T - Cost Sharing $21,574,975 50 $575,084 3 2.67% 6.00% 0.11%
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee $1,916,305,108 3174 $175,533,215 204 9.16% 6.43% 9.71%
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee $379,635,498 96 $8,770,228 8 2.31% 8.33% 1.92%
Y - Time and Materials $1,135,150,468 1573 $109,080,298 222 9.61% 14.11% 5.75%
Z - Labor Hour $181,887,440 273 $80,233,959 116 44.11% 42.49% 0.92%
Total $19,733,040,849 15714 $5,038,331,141 3239 25.53% 20.61% 100.00%
D1A - Type of Entity Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $911,955,691 1539 $341,675,527 578 37.47% 37.56% 4.62%
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S. $1,269,886,249 2314 $350,000,693 453 27.56% 19.58% 6.44%
B - Other Small in U.S. $1,635,130,149 2768 $239,884,021 392 14.67% 14.16% 8.29%
C - Large in U.S. $13,751,598,800 7404 $3,448,422,796 1429 25.08% 19.30% 69.69%
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency $121,546,408 179 $38,409,844 67 31.60% 37.43% 0.62%
F - Hospital $575,590 2 $575,590 2 100.00% 100.00% 0.00%
L - Foreign Concern/Entity $433,639,071 670 $100,734,073 153 23.23% 22.84% 2.20%
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S. $384,562,295 240 $113,036,133 122 29.39% 50.83% 1.95%
T - Historically Black College $898,356 6 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
U - Minority Institution $5,054,257 16 $447,997 2 8.86% 12.50% 0.03%
V - Other Educational $167,561,977 379 $3,143,090 11 1.88% 2.90% 0.85%
Z - Other Nonprofit $1,050,632,006 197 $402,001,377 30 38.26% 15.23% 5.32%
Total $19,733,040,849 15714 $5,038,331,141 3239 25.53% 20.61% 100.00%
FY 2001
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2001
Total PBSA % PBSA
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2001
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Appendix D:  Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service 
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2002 
 
B12A - Service Category Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars of Total
A $9,384,582,101 4833 $911,685,245 279 9.71% 5.77% 42.06%
B $493,684,925 463 $65,451,003 85 13.26% 18.36% 2.21%
D $863,411,994 1181 $404,155,906 543 46.81% 45.98% 3.87%
E $9,069,698 9 $3,030,064 6 0.00% 0.00% 0.04%
F $84,659,024 135 $18,042,034 27 21.31% 20.00% 0.38%
G $15,761,156 24 $543,637 3 3.45% 12.50% 0.07%
H $49,354,140 28 $5,992,026 12 12.14% 42.86% 0.22%
I $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
J $1,842,423,172 2065 $454,181,233 490 24.65% 23.73% 8.26%
K $408,947,473 300 $46,903,111 34 11.47% 11.33% 1.83%
L $901,123,782 240 $574,938,293 181 63.80% 75.42% 4.04%
M $682,583,799 391 $483,219,157 268 70.79% 68.54% 3.06%
N $34,621,212 84 $10,683,024 23 30.86% 27.38% 0.16%
O $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
P $19,886,640 41 $2,309,136 6 11.61% 14.63% 0.09%
Q $17,871,097 44 $7,323,191 28 40.98% 63.64% 0.08%
R $3,561,532,312 3391 $1,330,224,061 1368 37.35% 40.34% 15.96%
S $856,956,221 976 $513,004,856 591 59.86% 60.55% 3.84%
T $43,995,336 84 $22,218,156 41 50.50% 48.81% 0.20%
U $236,157,686 336 $98,147,150 107 41.56% 31.85% 1.06%
V $1,569,942,101 1288 $1,487,411,634 1026 94.74% 79.66% 7.04%
W $83,375,503 75 $25,179,471 32 30.20% 42.67% 0.37%
X $10,902,510 20 $7,330,632 12 67.24% 60.00% 0.05%
Z $1,139,995,326 2492 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 5.11%
Total $22,310,837,208 18500 $6,471,973,020 5162 29.01% 27.90% 100.00%
C5 - Type of Contract Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $1,084,860,282 1947 $498,603,796 867 45.96% 44.53% 4.86%
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm $57,239,870 15 $1,754,112 3 3.06% 20.00% 0.26%
J - Firm Fixed Price $8,730,084,054 8059 $3,125,975,698 2814 35.81% 34.92% 39.13%
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj $85,923,869 123 $47,077,487 50 54.79% 40.65% 0.39%
L - Fixed Price Incentive $799,491,111 154 $366,573,315 38 45.85% 24.68% 3.58%
M - Fixed Price Award Fee $265,178,410 191 $160,831,283 97 60.65% 50.79% 1.19%
R - Cost Plus Award Fee $6,287,966,577 1479 $1,634,430,280 461 25.99% 31.17% 28.18%
S - Cost Contract $651,836,670 449 $22,087,011 21 3.39% 4.68% 2.92%
T - Cost Sharing $24,691,965 51 $197,104 1 0.80% 1.96% 0.11%
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee $2,289,395,582 3790 $241,046,273 240 10.53% 6.33% 10.26%
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee $413,727,372 227 $67,516,249 32 16.32% 14.10% 1.85%
Y - Time and Materials $1,465,221,100 1787 $263,380,346 475 17.98% 26.58% 6.57%
Z - Labor Hour $155,220,346 228 $42,500,066 63 27.38% 27.63% 0.70%
Total $22,310,837,208 18500 $6,471,973,020 5162 29.01% 27.90% 100.00%
D1A - Type of Entity Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $1,084,860,282 1947 $498,603,796 867 45.96% 44.53% 4.86%
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S. $1,360,607,365 2682 $425,063,809 661 31.24% 24.65% 6.10%
B - Other Small in U.S. $1,803,197,694 3127 $528,897,624 753 29.33% 24.08% 8.08%
C - Large in U.S. $15,521,075,218 8709 $4,326,819,042 2264 27.88% 26.00% 69.57%
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency $152,352,594 205 $77,507,811 111 50.87% 54.15% 0.68%
F - Hospital $499,828 2 $499,828 2 100.00% 100.00% 0.00%
L - Foreign Concern/Entity $402,719,220 694 $132,047,363 214 32.79% 30.84% 1.81%
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S. $580,988,101 409 $241,634,219 179 41.59% 43.77% 2.60%
T - Historically Black College $1,763,791 8 $287,447 1 16.30% 12.50% 0.01%
U - Minority Institution $17,356,716 33 $274,592 1 1.58% 3.03% 0.08%
V - Other Educational $516,808,652 476 $22,292,128 29 4.31% 6.09% 2.32%
Z - Other Nonprofit $868,607,747 208 $218,045,361 80 25.10% 38.46% 3.89%
Total $22,310,837,208 18500 $6,471,973,020 5162 29.01% 27.90% 100.00%
FY 2002
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2002
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2002
Total PBSA % PBSA
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Appendix E:  Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service 
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2003 
 
B12A - Service Category Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars of Total
A $9,575,552,634 4891 $726,215,589 181 7.58% 3.70% 33.58%
B $635,771,064 546 $186,191,421 242 29.29% 44.32% 2.23%
D $1,000,332,031 1398 $512,450,598 683 51.23% 48.86% 3.51%
E $17,874,639 19 $7,076,060 9 0.00% 0.00% 0.06%
F $49,870,022 97 $7,885,775 14 15.81% 14.43% 0.17%
G $18,334,219 23 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.06%
H $1,801,001,078 54 $16,121,674 21 0.90% 38.89% 6.32%
I $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
J $2,492,334,950 2135 $615,362,382 543 24.69% 25.43% 8.74%
K $462,965,382 247 $132,624,877 63 28.65% 25.51% 1.62%
L $956,229,751 269 $673,143,323 185 70.40% 68.77% 3.35%
M $745,981,152 407 $554,254,254 317 74.30% 77.89% 2.62%
N $30,266,779 84 $5,471,967 21 18.08% 25.00% 0.11%
O $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
P $17,695,575 39 $10,290,523 17 58.15% 43.59% 0.06%
Q $25,675,207 62 $20,859,248 44 81.24% 70.97% 0.09%
R $4,247,421,424 4089 $1,782,642,691 1805 41.97% 44.14% 14.90%
S $1,360,555,553 1133 $1,047,016,864 856 76.96% 75.55% 4.77%
T $45,953,984 82 $12,823,609 25 27.91% 30.49% 0.16%
U $298,889,044 300 $138,853,352 120 46.46% 40.00% 1.05%
V $2,699,981,982 2249 $2,623,676,457 2059 97.17% 91.55% 9.47%
W $45,448,357 104 $28,455,510 51 62.61% 49.04% 0.16%
X $20,448,343 32 $2,024,638 6 9.90% 18.75% 0.07%
Z $1,963,050,974 3683 $95,928,147 139 4.89% 3.77% 6.89%
Total $28,511,634,144 21943 $7,663,018,554 7401 26.88% 33.73% 100.00%
C5 - Type of Contract Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $1,549,124,081 2527 $759,373,566 1257 49.02% 49.74% 5.43%
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm $1,282,309 4 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
J - Firm Fixed Price $10,816,371,305 10277 $4,506,576,657 4268 41.66% 41.53% 37.94%
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj $105,365,465 137 $64,154,948 67 60.89% 48.91% 0.37%
L - Fixed Price Incentive $1,004,835,015 195 $437,987,462 75 43.59% 38.46% 3.52%
M - Fixed Price Award Fee $311,762,857 217 $200,655,058 101 64.36% 46.54% 1.09%
R - Cost Plus Award Fee $7,718,613,781 1600 $2,402,707,218 622 31.13% 38.88% 27.07%
S - Cost Contract $1,020,315,505 603 $58,632,040 73 5.75% 12.11% 3.58%
T - Cost Sharing $19,603,510 39 $287,210 1 1.47% 2.56% 0.07%
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee $2,673,019,694 3944 $177,020,743 172 6.62% 4.36% 9.38%
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee $1,327,641,370 284 $177,422,181 134 13.36% 47.18% 4.66%
Y - Time and Materials $1,872,012,961 1978 $381,820,710 587 20.40% 29.68% 6.57%
Z - Labor Hour $91,686,291 138 $32,731,166 44 35.70% 31.88% 0.32%
Total $28,511,634,144 21943 $9,199,368,959 7401 32.27% 33.73% 100.00%
D1A - Type of Entity Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $1,549,124,081 2527 $759,373,566 1257 49.02% 49.74% 5.43%
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S. $1,969,279,080 3412 $639,129,131 882 32.45% 25.85% 6.91%
B - Other Small in U.S. $1,977,648,257 3570 $610,972,697 886 30.89% 24.82% 6.94%
C - Large in U.S. $19,455,047,911 10000 $5,748,012,382 3506 29.55% 35.06% 68.24%
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency $182,285,964 234 $109,845,413 155 60.26% 66.24% 0.64%
F - Hospital $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
L - Foreign Concern/Entity $547,313,160 913 $163,695,701 263 29.91% 28.81% 1.92%
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S. $1,136,008,192 531 $719,790,367 342 63.36% 64.41% 3.98%
T - Historically Black College $7,857,520 10 $292,398 1 3.72% 10.00% 0.03%
U - Minority Institution $23,619,055 27 $278,684 1 1.18% 3.70% 0.08%
V - Other Educational $741,796,964 513 $41,179,254 46 5.55% 8.97% 2.60%
Z - Other Nonprofit $921,653,960 206 $406,799,366 62 44.14% 30.10% 3.23%
Total $28,511,634,144 21943 $9,199,368,959 7401 32.27% 33.73% 100.00%
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2003
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2003
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2003
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Appendix F:  Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service 
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2004 
 
B12A - Service Category Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars of Total
A $10,189,430,033 5287 $1,055,063,639 1217 10.35% 23.02% 38.23%
B $514,726,664 521 $173,605,864 216 33.73% 41.46% 1.93%
D $1,170,926,890 1422 $485,624,303 550 41.47% 38.68% 4.39%
E $15,361,540 22 $5,624,880 6 0.00% 0.00% 0.06%
F $23,748,131 59 $7,619,569 20 32.08% 33.90% 0.09%
G $14,839,169 20 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.06%
H $44,170,851 56 $4,628,299 11 10.48% 19.64% 0.17%
I $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
J $2,787,632,290 2202 $438,504,910 325 15.73% 14.76% 10.46%
K $370,755,305 238 $103,485,248 42 27.91% 17.65% 1.39%
L $918,150,538 274 $309,530,630 126 33.71% 45.99% 3.45%
M $802,913,906 389 $351,133,681 210 43.73% 53.98% 3.01%
N $15,911,123 54 $1,651,236 6 10.38% 11.11% 0.06%
O $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
P $12,632,205 27 $2,082,612 2 16.49% 7.41% 0.05%
Q $33,328,602 107 $11,528,181 35 34.59% 32.71% 0.13%
R $4,387,159,765 4174 $1,495,270,742 1757 34.08% 42.09% 16.46%
S $1,288,053,619 1023 $902,777,998 525 70.09% 51.32% 4.83%
T $35,925,233 77 $7,637,980 17 21.26% 22.08% 0.13%
U $255,153,508 367 $85,236,097 78 33.41% 21.25% 0.96%
V $2,250,437,179 1611 $2,182,552,287 1385 96.98% 85.97% 8.44%
W $23,590,619 66 $9,953,067 14 42.19% 21.21% 0.09%
X $16,633,739 36 $1,451,198 2 8.72% 5.56% 0.06%
Z $1,478,510,827 2549 $28,056,133 61 1.90% 2.39% 5.55%
Total $26,649,991,736 20581 $7,663,018,554 6605 28.75% 32.09% 100.00%
C5 - Type of Contract Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $1,835,247,266 2603 $774,622,087 1157 42.21% 44.45% 6.89%
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm $5,694,130 4 $584,248 1 10.26% 25.00% 0.02%
J - Firm Fixed Price $8,320,539,039 8644 $3,551,485,090 2770 42.68% 32.05% 31.22%
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj $57,612,003 81 $40,581,918 42 70.44% 51.85% 0.22%
L - Fixed Price Incentive $533,700,092 156 $98,393,381 26 18.44% 16.67% 2.00%
M - Fixed Price Award Fee $251,423,539 157 $138,131,128 80 54.94% 50.96% 0.94%
R - Cost Plus Award Fee $6,822,988,443 1419 $1,455,474,240 482 21.33% 33.97% 25.60%
S - Cost Contract $1,348,607,615 831 $265,036,550 187 19.65% 22.50% 5.06%
T - Cost Sharing $21,750,240 32 $3,261,066 9 14.99% 28.13% 0.08%
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee $4,059,934,898 4299 $710,685,413 1225 17.50% 28.49% 15.23%
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee $1,138,326,852 295 $263,135,801 141 23.12% 47.80% 4.27%
Y - Time and Materials $2,152,576,133 1885 $332,187,028 432 15.43% 22.92% 8.08%
Z - Labor Hour $101,591,486 175 $29,440,604 53 28.98% 30.29% 0.38%
Total $26,649,991,736 20581 $7,663,018,554 6605 28.75% 32.09% 100.00%
D1A - Type of Entity Dollars Actions Dollars Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Blank $1,835,247,266 2,603 $774,622,087 1,157 42.21% 44.45% 6.89%
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S. $1,708,032,459 3023 $434,865,318 603 25.46% 19.95% 6.41%
B - Other Small in U.S. $2,222,974,939 3625 $817,337,558 1188 36.77% 32.77% 8.34%
C - Large in U.S. $17,160,563,691 9136 $4,492,855,188 2958 26.18% 32.38% 64.39%
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency $185,737,008 203 $46,138,363 66 24.84% 32.51% 0.70%
F - Hospital $0 0 $0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
L - Foreign Concern/Entity $569,502,895 742 $155,959,853 230 27.39% 31.00% 2.14%
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S. $1,059,490,953 399 $663,788,582 201 62.65% 50.38% 3.98%
T - Historically Black College $258,409 2 $119,999 1 46.44% 50.00% 0.00%
U - Minority Institution $29,367,435 46 $2,590,740 9 8.82% 19.57% 0.11%
V - Other Educational $858,241,084 583 $213,364,499 106 24.86% 18.18% 3.22%
Z - Other Nonprofit $1,020,575,597 219 $61,376,367 86 6.01% 39.27% 3.83%
Total $26,649,991,736 20581 $7,663,018,554 6605 28.75% 32.09% 100.00%
FY 2004
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2004
Total PBSA % PBSA
FY 2004
Total PBSA % PBSA
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Appendix G: Contingency Tables  
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Any row with an “?” indicates that no code was selected for that variable for that 
particular action. 
 
 123
 
Appendix H:  Parameter Estimates for Logistic Regression Model without Unstable 
or Biased Variables. 
 
Intercept
B1C - Bundled Contract   [N]
B13B - Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract  [A]
B13B - Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract  [B]
B13B - Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract  [C]
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity  [A]
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity  [B]
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity  [C]
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity  [D]
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity  [E]
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use  [A]
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use  [B]
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use  [C]
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use  [D]
C14 - Commercial Items  [N]
C14 - Commercial Items  [Y]
D1C - HUBZone Representation  [N]
D1C - HUBZone Representation  [Y]
D1D - Ethnic Group  [A]
D1D - Ethnic Group  [B]
D1D - Ethnic Group  [C]
D1D - Ethnic Group  [D]
D1D - Ethnic Group  [E]
D1D - Ethnic Group  [F]
D1D - Ethnic Group  [Z]
D7 - SBIR Program  [A]
D7 - SBIR Program  [B]
D7 - SBIR Program  [C]
D7 - SBIR Program  [D]
Term
1.15945266
-1.0217948
0.11027158
0.00593461
-0.2293267
-1.4259021
-0.3498394
-0.6077224
0.37374773
3.24672216
 0.0541297
-0.2464587
0.36786891
0.07654513
-0.4662438
0.94984336
0.11716142
-0.2752741
0.12115866
0.32562806
0.20367995
 -0.259404
0.07389066
-0.5987701
 -0.000672
-0.0412664
-0.3835844
-0.2049099
-0.5647882
Estimate
0.1493497
0.0742649
 0.029991
0.0269594
0.0658999
0.0733505
0.3140916
0.0975302
0.0867607
0.0928443
 0.089726
0.0939629
0.0720396
0.0420865
 0.072445
0.0739473
0.0222081
0.0397144
0.1018073
0.0639912
0.0518348
0.0562419
0.0475593
0.1075247
0.0673468
0.1044959
0.3166887
0.1111629
0.2275421
Std Error
 60.27
189.30
 13.52
  0.05
 12.11
377.90
  1.24
 38.83
 18.56
1222.9
  0.36
  6.88
 26.08
  3.31
 41.42
164.99
 27.83
 48.04
  1.42
 25.89
 15.44
 21.27
  2.41
 31.01
  0.00
  0.16
  1.47
  3.40
  6.16
ChiSquare
<.0001
<.0001
0.0002
0.8258
0.0005
<.0001
0.2654
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.5463
0.0087
<.0001
0.0689
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.2340
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.1203
<.0001
0.9920
0.6929
0.2258
0.0653
0.0131
Prob>ChiSq
For log odds of H/M
Parameter Estimates
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and make recommendations for PBSA implementation improvements.  The results conclude that the USAF 
is not meeting interim PBSA goals and will most likely fall short of the FY 2005 PBSA goal.  These results 
suggest that the goals may not have been reasonable and that the USAF has hit a natural plateau in PBSA 
use.   
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